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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Research Topic and Research Question 
“Can violent actions take place in a democracy? (…) Would someone want to 
overthrow such democracy? Of course, he would, since it is a self-negating system of 
democracy… a democracy that refutes itself” 
[Excerpt from statement of alleged Greek terrorist, 17N member Giannopoulos, in his court 
testimony, 25th July, 2003]1 
 
The past few decades have shown that domestic terrorism is a continuing social 
phenomenon that cannot be overlooked by the public, politicians and scholars alike. Both the 
acts of terror committed by radical leftist terror groups in the 1970s and 1980s against fellow 
citizens in Germany, Belgium and Italy2 and to the present day Greek leftist splinter terrorist 
groups and the ‘homegrown’ radicalized Islamic organized terrorist cells in western Europe 
point at this continuum. The recent cold-blooded assassination of the editorial staff of the 
satirical magazine ‘Charlie Hebdo’ in Paris demonstrates that escalation to extreme violence 
can happen unexpectedly in a short time span and without much prior warning. For 
researchers and policy-makers in the field of terrorism studies, the most puzzling question that 
arises in the aftermath of such attacks is why certain persons in western liberal states are 
willing to commit gross atrocities against innocent fellow citizens instead of using non-violent 
manners for achieving policy changes. The thesis intends to contribute to existing academic 
literature by focusing on this question.  
 The attack in September 2001 by Al-Qaeda against American targets undoubtedly is 
the clearest example of a massive-scale international terrorist atrocity committed against large 
groups of innocent citizens. This form of terror, however, should be distinguished from 
domestic terrorism, also known by its popularized synonym ‘homegrown terrorism’. The 
unique characteristic of the latter type is that such terror is largely independent from 
internationally operating terrorist cells and evolves out of mainly self-organized and self-
radicalized individuals that have experienced their entire upbringing, schooling and cultural 
influence in the country that they are active in (Precht 2007, 9). Some locally organized 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Cited from Kassimeris (2013, 30) 2	  Respectively the German RAF (Rote Armee Fraktion), the Belgian CCC (Cellules Communistes 
Combattantes) and the Italian PCI (‘Partito Communista Italiano’).	  2	  Respectiv ly the Germ n RAF (Rote Armee Fraktion), the Belgian CCC (Cellules Communistes 
Combattantes) and the Italian PCI (‘Partito Communista Italiano’).	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activist groups have the willingness and capacity to shift their modus operandi into the usage 
of excessive violent political force aimed at the citizenry that they are part of. In this respect, 
domestic terrorism presents societies with a fundamental and structural social problem: they 
consist of members that have a sense of alienation and disconnectedness, combined with a 
deeply rooted hatred against general prevailing essential values of the (Western) community 
that were part of their upbringing (Precht 2007, 9). This has severe implications for the way 
the causal factors that lie behind domestic terror are perceived, since they seem to stem from 
intra-societal dynamics rather than inter-state mechanisms. 
 Moreover, it should be noted that the current numbers of ‘homegrown’ extremist 
individuals in Western Europe, mostly radical Muslims, do certainly not indicate that their 
occurrence is merely incidental. Instead, they point at a disturbing and alarming structural 
social problem. In November 2007, the Director General of the British MI5 stated that they 
had identified “at least 2.000 individuals who are believed to pose a direct threat to national 
security and public safety because of their support for terrorism.” In addition, he declared, 
“We expect that there are as many again that we do not yet know off”(Precht 2007, 10). 
Political officials in all of Western Europe signal an alarming increase in numbers of 
radicalized Islamic youth. This statistic reaffirms the importance of disclosing what factors 
contribute to the radicalization of such extremist organizations and their willingness to carry 
out heinous acts against innocent fellow citizens.  
 I propose to focus exclusively on Western ‘homegrown’ terrorism for three reasons. 
Firstly, it is estimated by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)3 that this form of political 
violence accounts for 90 to 95% of the total worldwide terrorist activity. Moreover, Engene 
(2004) argues that domestic terrorism has claimed nearly 3000 innocent civilian casualties4 
since the 1950s. Secondly, due to the recent perceived threat posed by primarily domestic 
Islamic groups in Western Europe, domestic terrorism has gained significantly more attention 
in the political and public discourse of European states over the past 10-15 years, thereby 
adding to its societal relevance. Thirdly, I find it particularly incomprehensible that such a 
resort to political violence has continuously occurred in liberal democracies, since such state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Excerpt the website of the Global Terrorism Database:	  http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/: “The GTD is an open-
source database including information on terrorist events around the world from 1970 through 2013 (with annual 
updates planned for the future). Unlike many other event databases, the GTD includes systematic data on 
domestic as well as international terrorist incidents that have occurred during this time period and now includes 
more than 125,000 cases”  
4 According to the TWEED Database (Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data): folk.uib.no/sspje/tweed.htm: 
“The TWEED data set contains information on events related to internal (or domestic) terrorism in 18 West 
European countries for the 1950 through 2004 period.” Side note: “TWEED does contain, however, cases where 
an agent from one West European country carries out attacks in a different country within the region.” 
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regimes supposedly have a low active and passive participation threshold and should thus 
offer many opportunities for aggrieved citizens to exert political influence in non-violent 
ways. Moreover, democracies generally do not engage in brutal injustices against their own 
population and thus it seems illogical that citizens are being driven to outbursts of violent 
desperation even though little injustice is being inflicted against them. The fact that domestic 
terrorism occurs in democracies is odd and it points at the enduring theoretical and empirical 
puzzle that this thesis is going to engage in.  
The link between democracy and the proliferation of domestic terrorism has received 
much attention in both the political and scholarly discourse (Chenoweth 2013, 356-357). The 
prevailing wisdom amongst many Western political leaders is that the global spread of 
democracy serves as a powerful remedy against the use of terrorism by aggrieved political 
groups that are seeking to express their discontent. Former American President George W. 
Bush was arguably one of the most passionate supporters of this premise. He proclaimed in 
his Second Inaugural Address: “The best antidote to radicalism and terror is the tolerance 
kindled in free societies”5. Thus the overthrow of hostile and authoritarian regimes in support 
of democracy was deemed righteous, as its key defining traits (equality, freedom and justice) 
would ultimately lead to more just, prosperous and a ‘terrorism-free’ world. Recently, during 
the uprisings that occurred in the ‘Arab Spring’, many experts and policymakers still fiercely 
endorsed this policy rationale. They speculated that the unfolding events in the Arab World 
were to be understood as a clear sign that the transition to democracy would gradually bring 
about more political opportunities for dissatisfied citizens. They would be able to use their 
newly obtained rights as a peaceful outlet to manifest their political hardships.  
 
The democracy – terrorism link 
Much scholarly research has scrutinized the perceived negative relationship between 
democracy and terrorism. Historical analysis has actually given reason to believe that such an 
optimistic depiction of reality might not be valid. Data retrieved from the GTD has given 
evidence to suggest that “At least during the period 1968-1997, relatively poor and 
transitioning democracies with internally inconsistent institutions were more likely to 
experience domestic terrorism than advanced democracies and authoritarian regimes” 
(Chenoweth 2013, 356). Although this claim has not been uncontested, it does point at a 
striking second puzzle. Not only is it curious that domestic terrorism systematically occurs in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Washington Post, March 9th 2005, Bush calls democracy terror’s antidote.	  Source: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/03/25/AR2005032504962.html 
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democracies. The fact that it even seems to occur with a higher frequency is even more 
counterintuitive  (Chenoweth 2014, 1). Evenly perplexing is the variation of the prevalence of 
terrorism amongst democracies. Indeed the GTD also demonstrates that some states, such as 
Greece, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States have a disturbing track record 
when it comes to their experiences with domestic terrorism. Other states, such as the 
Scandinavian countries, Canada, Japan and South Korea have not struggled with these 
alarming numbers. This discrepancy is in need of a substantial explanation. Also, can such an 
explanation also spell out the recent emergence of domestic Islamic groups in Western 
Europe? This thesis also seeks to explore this secondary question. 
 Researchers have proposed numerous possible interactions between democracy and 
terrorism. While some scholars claim that the former leads to increasing levels of terror, 
others state exactly the opposite, claiming that democracy reduces citizens’ tendency to 
escalate to terrorism as a political tool. Democracy is often portrayed as an open arena or 
forum where competing interests are expressed. Much scholarly discussion evolves around 
the ascribed consequences of this essential feature of democracy for levels of terrorism. 
Paradoxically, the debate consists of two theoretical positions that claim two competing 
effects. The ‘democratic forum’ is perceived to lead to various “avenues for interest 
articulation among citizens”, which results in their endorsement of peaceful resolutions of 
conflict (Schmid 1992, 14-15). However, this forum is also perceived to lead to more 
competiveness in the public realm. This political competition in democracies tends to provoke 
acts of terrorism, as ideologically diverse groups compete with one another for limited 
influence (Chenoweth, 2010 16). Both strands come to different empirical conclusions, which 
are predominantly based on quantitative large n-studies. A preponderance of studies postulate 
“that something about democracy might promote terror” (Young and Dugan 2011, 19). 
However, due to the absence of substantial and systematic qualitative research, a full 
understanding of the complex causal chain by which democracy affects terrorism is lacking. 
This thesis primarily aims at addressing this scientific gap by conducting a case study to test 
which causal mechanism is at work, thereby adding to the explanatory value of either one (or 
both) scholarly position. 
 I propose to research the following general research question to address this puzzle:  
 
Given democracy’s opportunities to engage in legal channels to express political preferences 
and to change undesired policy, under what conditions are citizens of democratic states 
motivated to engage in costly and violent acts of terrorism? 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
  
Due to the grave physical and structural dangers it poses to Western governments and 
society, domestic terrorism has been a widely studied phenomenon. Scholars have identified 
many differing causal factors over the past few decades. Policy-makers have continuously 
deemed such preliminary investigations in causality crucial since such inquiries can offer 
fitting and thus adequate counter-terrorism strategies. This chapter intends to offer a thematic 
overview of the existing approaches that the literature has taken to explain domestic terrorism. 
Subsequently, their conclusions and weaknesses are critically evaluated. For the sake of 
clarity, I will present a workable definition of the concept of domestic terrorism based on 
similar definitions that have been established in the literature. But before doing so, I shall 
firstly outline a few persistent conceptual problems that have continuously hampered the 
study of terrorism. 
 
A workable definition and conceptual difficulties  
Academic study of domestic terrorism has been troubled because of the absence of an 
agreed definition of what the central concept constitutes of (Lutz and Lutz 2009, 2; Young 
and Ducan 2011, 19). Throughout the literature, social scientists cannot agree on what exactly 
defines terrorism and what distinguishes it from other types of political violence. Schmid and 
Jongman (1988), who conducted their search in the eighties, already collected no less than 
100 definitions of terrorism. The absence of an agreed definition evolves out of an important 
persevering conceptual challenge that has afflicted many conceptualizations of terrorism. At 
the core of this conceptual flaw lies the struggle to identify those specific acts of violence that 
are exclusively linked to domestic terrorism and that are distinct from other forms of political 
violence, such as insurgencies and state-led warfare behaviour (Sánchez-Cuenca and De La 
Calle 2009, 33). An abundance of social scientists have attempted to define terrorism in terms 
of which acts of violence ought to be labelled ‘terroristic’. As a consequence, terrorism 
becomes a type of political violence that can be carried out by a multiplicity of actors. This, as 
I will argue in the following paragraph, affects any systematic coherent definition of 
terrorism. 
 A commonly perceived discerning feature of terrorism is its readiness to perpetrate 
acts against innocent individuals to advance political goals directed against a broader 
audience target, which usually is the established political elite. However, according to 
Wagner (2000, 469-484), such a contrast between the immediate target and a broader 
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audience can actually be observed in many examples of general warfare behaviour. The two 
atomic bombs dropped on the Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the American 
Army, as well as the allied bombing on the German city of Dresden in World War II are plain 
examples of intimidation from the U.S. High Command directed against respectively the 
Japanese and German government. Clearly, in those cases, “the civilians attacked were not the 
audience target” (Sánchez-Cuenca and De La Calle 2009, 33). In addition, insurgent groups in 
civil wars frequently perpetrate acts of violence against innocent civilians when they aim to 
coerce the established elite as the immediate target. For example, the Peruvian Maoist 
guerrilla insurgent organization Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) deliberatively killed 
Peruvian Lima locals in the 1980s when it mounted attacks and sabotages against the capital’s 
infrastructure. 
 The reliance on the threat of violence and spreading fear to achieve political objectives 
is also frequently identified as a typical terroristic action. Likewise, this phenomenon ought 
not to be distinctively labelled as exclusively ‘terroristic’. The importance of instilling fear is 
a mechanism that is actually being implemented in all types of small and large-scale forms of 
political violence. “Violence is a means to generate compliance” (Sánchez-Cuenca and De La 
Calle 2009, 33).  
 All these issues raised here demonstrate the core of the conceptual problem that 
troubles any definition of domestic terrorism that seeks to define terrorism on the basis of 
what kind of acts ought to be labelled ‘terroristic’. As I demonstrated in the previous 
paragraphs, many actors, both individuals, organizations, insurgent groups, armies and 
governments, can ostensibly carry out acts of terrorism. Consequently, terrorism is being 
degraded to a simple ‘catchall’ concept that is used to denote any act of political violence 
whereby innocent individuals are harmed in order to advance some political goal.  
Alternatively, terrorism should not solely be defined on the basis of which actions are 
perpetrated, but on basis of what actor commits those actions. This actor-approach avoids the 
problematic issue of overstretching the concept of terrorism. Essentially, what distinguishes 
terrorists from other kinds of insurgent political force, is “(…) the extreme asymmetry of 
power between them and the state” (Sánchez-Cuenca and De La Calle 2009, 34). The 
difference between insurgent guerrilla factions then becomes evident. Whereas such political 
organizations have some sovereign control over some territory, terrorists in my definition do 
not have this authority. Subsequently terrorism exists merely as a clandestine underground 
political phenomenon. Whereas insurgent groups are highly dependant upon the popular 
support to maintain their conquered territory, “terrorist groups, instead, have very superficial 
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contact with the population because they cannot act in the open” (Sánchez-Cuenca and De La 
Calle 2009, 35). This is what also distinguishes them from organizations that are engaged in 
civil wars, which have a clear interest in mobilizing the support of the local population in 
order to topple the state regime. Likewise, whereas insurgents can have the potential to at 
least partially defeat the state regime militarily, terrorists can solely challenge the state by 
contesting its monopoly of violence. The ability to employ their power to contest the state 
turns them into a long-term organized threat, which exceeds the political violence that occurs 
during incidental outbursts of violent street riots. 
   
Proposed working definition  
 Lutz and Lutz (2009) have presented a fairly common and consequently 
comprehensible definition that is consistent with various prior definitions that can be found in 
the literature. Their definition consists of six separate but interrelated characteristics. 
Although this has arguably led to a more complex working definition, it has the major 
advantage of resolving the above-described conceptual challenge that hampered so many of 
the previously conducted theoretical studies on terrorism. Lutz and Lutz present the following 
definition of terrorism (2009): 
1. “Terrorism has political objectives; 
2. it relies on violence or the threat of violence; 
3. it has a target audience beyond the immediate victims; 
4. it involves organization and is not just the actions of isolated individuals; 
5. it involves a non-state actor as the perpetrator or the target or both; and 
6. it is the weapon of the weak designed to change the distribution of power.” 
Previously, I made the point that domestic terrorism is better defined in terms of who the 
actor is, in addition to which actions are characterized as ‘terrorist’.  This definition has the 
advantage of combining both action-based elements (features 1, 2 and 3) and actor-based 
elements (features 4, 5 and 6).  
The first three elements describe which crimes are terrorist crimes: those that are 
motivated by political objections (1), rely on physical violence (2) and have a target audience 
beyond the immediate victim (3), are typified as ‘terrorist’. However, as I discussed in the 
previous paragraphs, such a definition would be too broad, since it would not distinguish 
terrorism from other types of political violence such as insurgencies or state-led terror. The 
last three elements ascribe which actors can commit those actions is of great importance, 
since it narrows down the concept of terrorism. Only if a relatively weak non-state 
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organization (4, 5, 6) commits those actions, then it is fitting to label that type of political 
violence as terrorism. 
Thus, according to my definition, the FARC-organization in Colombia, as well as the 
IRA in Northern Ireland are, to a certain extent, insurgent groups, because they have some 
control over several rural areas and because they intentionally enjoy some popular support. 
Meanwhile, the ETA in Spain, the Italian Red Brigades (BR) and both the Revolutionary 
Popular Struggle (ETA) and RO17N groups in Greece have always deliberately operated 
underground, have never controlled state territory and have not actively attempted to mobilize 
large groups of supporters for their respective causes.6 
 
The difference between domestic and transnational terrorism 
A key issue is to separate acts of domestic from transnational terrorism. This 
consideration does not only have a practical purpose. It also serves an analytical and 
theoretical objective; through a clear distinction, domestic terrorism can be studied as a 
separate social phenomenon, which contains its own causal determinants and mechanisms. On 
the one hand, “domestic terrorism involves terrorists, victims, and territory of one state. 
Support, financing and operations for the terrorist attack are homegrown and are conducted 
within one country” (Chenoweth 2007, 19). This characteristic thus refers to the physical 
locus operandi of terrorism, and is based on a legal requirement: the full act, both its 
preparation and its execution, have to occur within the territorial jurisdiction of the state it 
originates from.7 Secondly, the perpetrators need to have had their upbringing in the state that 
they conduct their campaigns in.  
On the other hand, the label ‘transnational’ is used in the literature when an attack 
involves more than one state (Rosendorff and Sandler 2005, 172). Strictly speaking this 
implies that an organization’s intentional attack on foreign citizens, is to be considered as an 
act of international terror. ITERATE8, the commonly utilized dataset of international and 
transnational terrorist attacks, indeed counts some acts of the far-left 17N in Greece as 
international, because 7 of the 22 total fatalities were not Greek citizens, but primarily 
Americans. ITERATE disregards the fact that all of the killings were committed on Greek 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 It can be argued, however, that those anarcho-communist organizations actually did seek to mobilize the local 
population; in the sense that they used terrorism as a tool to raise awareness amongst the populace for the sake of 
inciting social revolution against the ruling class. These attempts have always been more idealistic in nature. On 
the contrary, insurgent groups need local support; otherwise they could not exert control over a certain territory 
and thus could practically not exist. 
7 Based on the legal definition used by the American FBI and the United States Law: http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism-definition.  
8 The dataset can be accessed on: http://library.duke.edu/data/collections/iterate	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territory. Meanwhile, the similar leftist Portuguese 25th April Popular Force movement 
(FB25) is excluded in this dataset, because their 20 killings in the 1980s are all on Portuguese 
nationals (Sánchez-Cuenca and De La Calle 2009, 37). According to my definition, those acts 
are both forms of domestic terrorism, since the perpetrators all had their upbringing in 
respectively Greece and Portugal and all had the objective to coerce their own government. 
  Lastly, a terrorist attack is also identified as transnational when terrorists commit 
their crimes outside the national boundaries. This requirement seems rather obvious. 
However, this part of a definition is also contentious when the attacks of the Northern Irish 
IRA are considered: some acts that were perpetrated in Northern Ireland while others on 
British targets overseas. The latter crimes would be viewed as international attacks, while the 
IRA is notoriously known for the frequent bombings that have occurred within its own 
national borders.  
In conclusion, I assert, just as Sánchez-Cuenca and De La Calle (2009) do, that what 
matters the most in distinguishing domestic from international terrorism is whether a non-
state clandestine organization acts in its ‘natural’ territory and seeks to coerce its own 
government. Consequently, identities of victims and the physical location are of lesser 
relevance.  
  
Towards a structural analysis of terrorism 
Traditionally, the critical assessment of what factors lead to individuals’ or groups’ 
decision to engage in costly and violent acts of terrorism was based on an ideographic 
approach (Qvortrup and Lijphart 2013, 473). For this reason scientific research approached 
different incidents of terrorism solely from a historical perspective. Explanations of terrorism 
that took into account more than one case were not considered useful. As a result, no common 
causal patterns were identified from the isolated terrorist cases. Laqueur (1977, 22) even 
claimed that any nomothetic study that would attempt to draft causal links between concepts 
would be “exceedingly vague or altogether wrong”.  
Crenshaw was one of the first in the field of terrorism literature to search for “a 
general theoretical analysis of the causes of terrorism” (1981, 379). She was able to develop 
such a general explanation because she approached terrorism as a type of political behaviour 
that is the result of a deliberate rational choice made by the respective terrorist organization. 
This insight proved useful since it invited scholars in the field to view terrorists as rational 
actors whose actions could be explained and even predicted based on the presence or absence 
of certain pre-existing causal factors. Henceforth researchers could make general prepositions 
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about terrorism, which could both be logically compared, and of which variables could be 
specified and rank-ordered in terms of explanatory strength (Crenshaw 1981, 380). For the 
sake of clarity, Crenshaw organized the research topic into three separate workable questions 
that were ready to be properly analysed: how does the process of terrorism work, what are its 
social and political effects and why does it occur? The latter question is of particular interest 
to this thesis. It invited scholars to undertake nomothetic studies in order to identify common 
patterns of causation. 
 
Overview of research on terrorism and democracy 
 Crenshaw’s argument sparked a preponderance of research that sought to determine 
what factors caused groups to exert extreme political violence. An important strand of 
academia began emphasizing institutional factors as the primary causes of terrorism. In 
general, this approach assumes that institutions are relevant and matter in terms of presence of 
(domestic) terrorism. The study of the effects of regime type gained momentum as researchers 
observed an ostensible relationship between the presence of terrorist incidents and modern 
democracies. Many scholars namely claimed that the bulk of terrorism is directed against 
democracies and not against illiberal regimes. In the last decade, this view was reinforced due 
to the high-profile attacks by Al-Qaeda on American and European soil. All in all, these 
events endorsed the longstanding conviction “that democracies are inherently susceptible to 
terrorist attacks” (Abrahms 2007, 226). Weinberg and Eubank (1994) asserted based on 
rudimentary investigation that “a terrorist attack was four times likely to occur in democracy 
than in a non-democratic country” (418). In addition, Gurr (1979), Turk (1982), Chenoweth 
(2010), and Young and Dugan (2010) base their work on the theoretical preposition that 
terrorism ostensibly occurs more frequently in liberal regimes than in non-democracies. 
Although the validity of this observation has been thoroughly contested and criticized 
(Abrahms 2007, 2010), I shall ignore these at this point for they still hold much theoretical 
explanatory power. 
 
Perspective 1: Effect of respect for civil and human rights 
 Scholars have critically evaluated and scrutinized the effects of various features of 
democracy. One perspective links the presence of civil liberties in a democracy to the 
occurrence of terrorist incidents. Respecting people’s civil rights is said to facilitate terrorism. 
The literature attributes different effects to this fundamental feature of liberal democracies:  
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Gurr (1979), Ross (1993) and Eyerman (1998) argue that because of people’s freedom 
of movement and association, terror organisations can more easily mobilize, manoeuver, arm 
themselves and subsequently act. Moreover, citizens’ human and civil rights tend to paralyze 
democracies and affect their capabilities to crush terrorist organizations. Li (2005, 283) argues 
that democracies do not have the power to exert unconstrained and excessively repressive 
countermeasures, nor do they have a straightforward possibility to convict alleged terrorists 
beforehand. Weinberg and Eubank (1987, 46-47) advance the argument that democracies are 
vulnerable to terrorists’ demands because their guarantees for civil liberties lead to citizens’ 
low cost tolerance for sustaining casualties of the civil population. In addition, press freedom 
is also said to create incentives for terrorism. As Atkinson, Sandler and Tschirhart (1987) 
point out: “Press freedom increases the opportunities for terrorists to be heard and watched by 
a large audience and hence their ability to create widespread fear” (Li 2005, 282). Schmid 
(1992) furthers the point by asserting that free press is capable of offering detailed 
information of terrorist events, thereby encouraging the process of recruitment, education and 
training of future perpetrators.   
However, it should be noted that the literature has also identified mitigating effects of 
civil liberties on terrorism (Li 2005, 281). The contention is that citizens, who enjoy more 
civil liberties, therefore also have more opportunities to influence the political process 
successfully. Schmid (1992, 15) argues that democratic participation through free elections 
makes sure that political and social change can be reached by peaceful means. This lowers the 
incentive to resort to political violence. Having a right to express political discontent can thus 
serve as a powerful remedy against violent outbreaks of political frustration and grief. 
Abrahms (2007, 242-251) also questions the positive relationship between civil rights and 
terrorism. Alternatively, he states that, precisely because democracies have a commitment to 
these rights, they are not inclined to fumble with these rights in the face of terrorist 
provocations. Consequently, liberal states can maintain “the support of the three 
constituencies – moderates, the international community and their own publics – essential to 
prevailing” (2007, 242). 
Regardless of the positive or negative effect of civil liberties on domestic terrorism, 
this explanation suffers from two weaknesses that severely impair its explanatory power. 
Firstly, the constitutional institutional constraint on the executive branch of government, 
which prevents a democratic state from reacting oppressively against subversive terrorists, is 
not always in place. Historically, liberal states have circumvented those institutionalized 
restrictions in the face of terrorism. For instance, a few years ago, the U.S. Congress passed 
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the American Service Member Protection Act (ASPA), thereby authorizing the Presidency 
much more powers to ‘fight the war on terror’. In other words, liberal states’ abilities to 
combat terrorism are not always restricted (Chenoweth 2007, 31).  
  The second, and more fundamental limitation of the civil liberties explanation is that 
it is exclusively ‘opportunity-based’ and that it fails to explain what the motivations are for 
terrorist groups to form (Abrahms 2007, 227; Chenoweth 2007, 30). The logic of the theory is 
that democracies, due to their openness and permissiveness, render rational terrorist 
organizations the greatest opportunity to undertake a successful terrorist campaign. However, 
such an explanation ignores that opportunity is merely “a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition” for a group to commit acts of terrorism (Ross 1993, 321-322). It fails to take into 
account that many political groups never use violence, although they might very well have the 
opportunity for it. And put differently, if opportunity alone would be a sufficient explanatory 
factor, then there should also be predominance of terrorism in the so-called ‘weak’ states that 
do not have the ability and authority to govern their own territory. However, several of these 
states, such as Belarus, Zimbabwe, Senegal and Honduras have not contained domestic 
terrorist movements (Stewart 2006, 31-32; Chenoweth 2007, 30-31), while any explanation 
based on the effect of civil liberties would expect so. This observation leads to the conclusion 
that there is something more fundamental, associated with the nature of a democracy, which 
attracts domestic terrorism. 
 
Perspective 2: Effect of democratic systems and their political institutions  
Another cluster of literature focuses on the consequences of the various democracy 
types and their corresponding institutions. The basic argument is that these systems aggregate 
political preferences differently, and thus they affect citizen satisfaction and frustration 
differently. Accordingly, this leads to varying effects on citizens’ incentives to engage in 
terrorism (Li 2005, 283-84). An example of this perspective is the work by Qvortrup (2012, 
516-17), who found empirical evidence that European states with first-past-the-post electoral 
systems are considerably more likely to experience domestic terrorism. Qvortrup and Lijphart 
(2013) have extended this literature by linking general democracy types to levels of domestic 
terrorism. Based on quantitative research, they claim that “The political system – or rather the 
type of democracy – is a major factor responsible for the presence of fatal terrorist attacks 
perpetrated by home-grown terrorist groups” (2013, 482). Using Lijphart’s well-known 
typological distinction between consensus and majoritarian democracies, they found support 
for their hypothesis that the more opportunities democratic citizens have for political 
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influence, the less they are inclined to engage in acts of terrorism (2013, 472). A high level of 
consociationalism in a democracy is associated with a low level of domestic terrorism. And so 
broad multiparty coalitions, multiparty systems, proportional representation, corporatist and 
coordinated interest groups systems and constitutional balance between the executive and 
legislative powers are all seen as predictors for low levels of domestic terrorism. On the 
contrary, one-party governments, two-party systems, majoritarian electoral systems, pluralist 
and competitive interest group systems and the dominance of the executive power are all 
indicators that positively influence domestic terrorism (2013, 478). Qvortrup and Lijphart’s 
work has built further on previous single-country case studies that had already anecdotally 
shown the importance of consensus institutions in mitigating the proliferation of domestic 
terrorism (2013, 474).  For instance, McGarry and O’ Leary (2006) have given this support 
with their case study of the effects of consociationalism in Northern Ireland. The fact that 
their theory is backed by both qualitative and quantitative research strengthens their proposed 
theory. 
The strength of this argument is that it, unlike the first perspective, can explain 
citizens’ motivations to adopt violence. Majoritarian democracies generally leave far less 
space for opposing views to be taken into consideration, and this could encourage violence as 
an ultimate means to advance a controversial policy goal. The second advantage of this 
rationale is that it can account for variation amongst liberal states. Indeed, majoritarian 
democracies, such as the U.S. and the UK, historically have suffered from more terrorist 
incidents than the consociational Scandinavian democratic states. 
On the contrary, a weakness of this claim is that it cannot explain fluctuations in 
terrorism over time. Greece, since it transitioned to modern democracy in 1974, has 
experienced an awful lot of terrorism, but the flow has not been constant. GTD data 
demonstrate that right after the transition terrorism peaked, and then gradually declined (see 
chapter 4) until it peaked again a few years later. The proposition is that terrorism is 
associated with a certain ‘cycle’. The presence or absence of certain indicators of 
consociationalism or majoritarian insufficiently account for such a cycle.  
 
Perspective 3: Effect of social mobilization  
Another subset of literature focuses on the interest group dynamics that can take place 
within a democracy. Chenoweth (2007, 2010) has an impressive record of published works on 
this matter. Her reasoning is based on the central premise that a democracy, due to its 
commitment to pluralism, freedom and equality, is inherently susceptible to all kinds of social 
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and political mobilization. This presumption leads her to assert that terrorism proliferates in 
democracies due to the dynamics between various mobilizing political interest groups that are 
active within the political realm. Such a rationale fits in the tradition of political mobilization 
theory. Scholars within this theoretical framework have been preoccupied with explaining 
terrorism as merely another mobilizing tactic that organizations may utilize “to increase their 
chances of achieving their goals and to enhance their uniqueness or attractiveness to potential 
recruits” (Chenoweth 2013, 367). An important difference between such a mobilization 
theory and the earlier mentioned ‘civil liberties theories’ (see perspective 1), is that the former 
relies less on tactical and strategic opportunities to explain groups’ resort to terrorist violence. 
Instead, mobilization theory associates violent attacks are more with the density and intensity 
of the polity’s interest group environment (Chenoweth 2013, 367). I will go into more detail 
on mobilization and Chenoweth’s theory in the following paragraphs. 
 
Interest group dynamics 
According to Becker (1983, 394-395), political organizations of all sorts necessarily 
push for influence and control in the public sphere. In democracies, these competitors can 
range from political parties, corporations, unions and lobby groups to terrorist groups. All 
these actors are examples of interest groups and henceforth I shall only use the term interest 
group to refer to any group that seeks to influence the polity, regardless of its means to do so. 
Central to the competition amongst them is their desire to achieve space and influence, by 
setting and maintaining a particular interest on the political agenda “to the exclusion of other 
issues, especially those in ideological opposition to the given issue” (Chenoweth 2007, 33). 
This is what makes the agenda-setting process, which usually originates in the public domain 
and secondarily takes place on an institutional level (the government’s schedule), so highly 
competitive. Interest group politics is defined in terms of which group can “influence 
controversial public policies in a manner disproportionate to their votes” (Congleton 2002, 
48). Social mobilization theory recognizes various resources that groups can choose to reach 
their policy goal. Conventional interest groups will make use of people and money to push 
their interests on the agenda. This is where the ‘agenda selection problem’ can happen; due to 
the inherent strains between competing organizations, an interest claim of one group can 
affect other groups’ interests. According to Chenoweth (2007, 36): “The probability and 
degree to which a group succeeds in obtaining space on the agenda increase as the resources 
devoted to exerting its influence expand. Conversely, the probability and extent to which it 
succeeds will decline with opponents’ efforts to resist its aims.” This means that one group’s 
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success is always relative to another’s failure. Groups are thus compelled to engage in a zero-
sum conflict game with one another. When groups are heavily opposed to each other in the 
political realm, this competitive dynamic can lead to an intensification and escalation of one’s 
methods to resist the possible loss of agenda-setting power. Those interest groups that ‘lose’ 
the power to influence the political agenda will “trim their losses and the gain to winners by 
lobbying, threats, disobedience, migration and other kinds of political pressure to raise their 
influence” (Becker 1983, 377). Such escalating tactics are a clear indication that the agenda is 
politically ‘saturated’. Inter-group conflict then is conceived as unresolvable and bound to 
getting out of hand. They can be motivated to escalate their political activities to the use of 
violence. Competing groups perceive a need to ‘outdo’ one another for influence thereby 
resulting in an overall escalation of violent activity. If the interest group playing field 
becomes so dense, competitive and ultimately violent, then the political realm becomes overly 
competitive and dangerous. This process has been called a ‘crowding effect’ (Chenoweth 
2007, 32-45 and 2010, 28). 
 
Chenoweth’s theory of the competitive logic 
Essentially, the main motivation to become violent is not inherently different from 
non-violent groups’ motivation to use additional resources such as money; they seek to 
preserve either the status quo or to bring about political chance (Chenoweth 2007, 37). Given 
that the ‘game’ of political competition leads to a zero-sum outcome, a decision to utilize 
violent expressions can be perfectly rational. Violence “may be less costly and more effective 
in achieving attention in the short-term than investing abundant conventional resources that 
are lacking” (Chenoweth 2007, 38). As, according to Chenoweth (2007, 2010), these groups 
potentially arise out of all kinds of organizations, their ideologies will also become more 
extremist to justify their use of violence. However, they also endorse a more extremist 
ideology as this can consolidate their political frustrations into a coherent identity. 
Subscribing to extremism can solve collective action problems within a violent group. Indeed, 
a strong group identity can advance a sense of togetherness and collective responsibility, 
which buttresses individuals’ decisions to comply with acts of extreme violent behaviour. 
Chenoweth’s theory makes the fundamental underlying assumption that terrorism is 
merely interest group politics by other means. It can be just another plan by which interest 
groups can determine or alter government’s policy outcomes. Adoption of violence simply is 
another more extreme method that arises out of an exhaustion of all the previously attempted 
tactics. Although terrorism is a high-risk undertaking, it is also far less costly and undoubtedly 
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leads to much effect since terrorism naturally leads to instant high levels attention from the 
public and policy-makers. 
As has been argued by many authors (Crenshaw 1981, Ross 1993), ultimately a 
terrorist offensive commences “with a precipitating event or circumstance that turns a group 
to adopting violence rather than utilizing conventional political means” (Chenoweth 2007, 
38). For Chenoweth, the initial act of violence is crucial. This is because, just like any other 
interest groups, terrorists are highly responsive and sensitive to the pressures exercised by 
other organizations. Here is where the quintessential element of her theory plays out: 
 
“The constant competitive tensions between conventional and violent interest groups 
in asserting themselves may lead to a “cascade effect” during which more groups adopt 
terrorism in response to a diminishing space on the public agenda due to initial violence” 
(Chenoweth 2007, 40) 
 
 Once again this demonstrates the rational logic behind the proliferation of domestic 
terrorism. As one group favours terrorism, which is a low-cost and short-term efficient 
undertaking, other groups will be driven to the same suboptimal outcome in the zero-sum 
game by also adopting violence. That is, essentially, the causal mechanism by which the 
democratic competition process lead to a domestic groups becoming terroristic. By the way, 
terrorists do often overestimate their political success of their tactics. Indeed an escalation to 
violence on a short-term can be highly successful since the impact of such acts often is 
significant. However, often they are not able to control the more long-term political effects of 
their tactical attacks (Chenoweth 2007, 38). 
 
Why uniquely democracies enhance the competitive logic 
The theory of the competitive logic is grounded on the effects of an overly crowded or 
saturated interest group sector. Interest group competition occurs in all political systems, even 
in non-democracies. However, Chenoweth makes three compelling arguments of why this 
logic applies solely to (certain types of) democracies. 
Firstly, democracies naturally have a much more competitive and densely populated 
interest group policy arena due to its commitment to freedom and consequently its incentive 
for association. This pluralist tradition inevitably results in more dense and competitive 
interest politics. In autocracies such a diverse environment in which interest groups pit against 
each other is usually absent. 
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Secondly, democracies inherently tolerate the existence of a free media, which have 
the power to set the political agenda without the government’s interference.  This open and 
transparent information society bolsters widespread media coverage on terrorist activity, 
which very often is highly sensational. Subsequently, interest groups become easily aware of 
one another’s actions and reactions. The competitive logic subscribes to a ‘cascade effect’, in 
which groups are obliged to react as a way to ‘outbid’ the others for political influence. This 
reaction is particularly present in the case of groups that are ideologically heavily opposed to 
each other. 
Thirdly, as I already have described extensively in the previous chapter, democracies’ 
commitment to civil liberties prevents them from reacting fiercely against terrorist 
organizations. On the other hand, authoritarian regimes often react to initial violence with 
extreme disproportionate counter-violence. The much more powerful repressive state 
authority can invite various violent interest groups to form a unified front against the state, 
thereby halting the increasing escalation of interest group violence. In other words, “The 
power asymmetry is so distorted under these conditions that terrorist groups will circumvent 
normal operations and solicit the help of other outcasts in order to confront a major threat to 
their very survival” (Chenoweth 2007, 55). Whereas non-democracies are more inclined to 
enhance cooperation between terrorists, democracies tend to provoke heavy competiveness 
amongst terrorist organizations. The harsh measures that the Israeli authorities impose on the 
Palestinian territories are a good example of this phenomenon. Palestinian organizations often 
have occasionally overcome their strategic and ideological difference to form an alliance of 
convenience against the Israelis. 
 
Core strengths and weaknesses  
  This outlook on the relationship between democracy and domestic terrorism is 
promising. Chenoweth’s approach has three significant advantages. The claims that she 
makes are promising and offer a clear frame by which domestic terrorism should be 
considered and researched in the future. 
 In the first place, her theory is unique in the sense that she is able to explain the 
theoretical link between domestic terrorism and democracy not merely on the basis of the 
opportunities, but on the basis of terrorists’ motivations. The competitive logic subscribes to a 
situation in which interest groups, due to the initial escalation of violence of a rival group, are 
motivated to react and also make use of violent methods to influence the agenda-setting 
process. 
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 In the second place, her theory is able to offer an explanation for the variation in 
domestic terrorism amongst democracies (Chenoweth 2013, 367). I already indicated that this 
is one of the puzzling facts that need more clarification. Indeed, this theory gives a plausible 
account for the discrepancies that exist between for instance the Scandinavian countries, 
which have always been relatively invulnerable from terrorism and Greece, which has an 
unfortunate track record of high levels of domestic terrorist violence ever since that country 
gradually democratized in the mid-seventies. Following the logic of the effect of a highly 
competitive interest group sector, it can be argued that states that traditionally have low levels 
of mobilization and thus hardly any extreme political competition (consociational 
democracies), also are less susceptible to domestic terrorist violence. 
 In the third place, the competitive logic, unlike other theories of domestic terrorism, 
has the “potential ability to identify the timing of different waves of terrorism” (Chenoweth 
2013, 367). It assumes that terrorism proliferates the most during times of political 
mobilization. Democratic regime transformations and election cycles are classical examples 
of times when citizens mobilize. These moments are therefore the most vulnerable and attract 
the most political violence. The potential to predict terrorism is unprecedented. Not only does 
this have promising opportunities for further analysis; it also can be of great use for policy-
makers that are preoccupied with counter violent extremism.  
 In the fourth place, Chenoweth has been able to find much support for her 
hypothesized claims by means of a substantial quantitative large-N study9. She found a 
statistically significant and positive correlation between terrorist group competition and the 
number of new terrorist groups emerging within a country. Likewise, she discovers a positive 
and statistically significant relationship between participation competition and new terrorist 
groups emerging. According to her conclusion, “participation competition, inter-group 
competition, and interest group density are fairly good predictors of whether terrorist groups 
will form in a state” (Chenoweth 2007, 81).  
The weakness of Chenoweth’s account, however, is the lack of existing with-in case 
studies that have tested whether this causal mechanism is indeed at work. Her core 
explanatory independent variables (participation competition, inter-group competition, and 
interest group density) are complex variables, which are difficult to quantify in a large-N 
study. Therefore, these variables are in need of more in-depth observation by means of a 
single within-case study. Chenoweth has acknowledged this shortcoming, and claims any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Chenoweth conducted a longitudinal analysis of 119 states for the period 1975-1997 using number of attacks 
originated in specific country as DV and Political competition as one of the IVs.	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large-N analysis is “susceptible to a great deal of residual error, much of which contains the 
most interesting nuances of causality. Indeed, it is virtually impossible to identify necessary 
and sufficient conditions using a large-n framework” (Chenoweth 2007, 82). The ‘cascade 
effect’ has been backed up by statistical evidence, but which intervening variables play a role 
in this ‘path of causality’ is unclear. Although she did conduct two separate more or less 
anecdotal case studies (Chenoweth 2007), in which she researched terrorist proliferation in 
the United Kingdom and Italy overtime, she did not subject her theory’s proposed causal 
mechanism to an in-depth analysis. She merely investigated a few preliminary observable 
implications but never analysed the full causal mechanism extensively. 
Secondly, her theory cannot really predict a decline in the number of emerging 
terrorist groups. The logic of competing interest groups suggests that, once a single group 
initiates violence, other groups follow that strategy to ensure a suboptimal outcome in the 
zero-sum conflict game. Theoretically, the implication of this argument is that terrorist groups 
are proliferating infinitely, “since the emergence and activity of a new group should compel 
even more groups to form leading to an endless cycle of competition and reactionary 
violence” (Chenoweth 2007, 249). Chenoweth does mention that the number of terrorist 
groups can decline when the so-called ‘carrying capacity’ of a democracy increases 
(Chenoweth 2007, 42). This can happen when structural long-term changes in the government 
are made, or when there is a shift in the existing social cleavages in society. However, this 
type of structural change typically takes place at a very slow and gradual rate. Historically, a 
more sudden rapid decline in the number of terrorist groups has occurred over time, 
“indicating that at least some groups tend to exercise at least some restraint even while they 
compete with other groups for power” (Chenoweth 2013, 368). 
Thirdly, her theory deals primarily with the explaining an increase in the number of 
terrorist groups, and not so much an increase in the number of terrorist incidents. Of course 
we can make the implicit argument that an increase in the number incidents follows logically 
from the increase in the number of groups. This claim, however, should be researched by 
means of a with-in case study. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
  
According to my evaluation of the existing literature about the link between domestic 
terrorism and democracy, the first perspective fails to explain why the vast majority do not 
become terrorists, although they might be evenly deprived of political influence. The second 
perspective overcomes this issue. However, it cannot identify the timing of different waves of 
terrorist violence. 
Chenoweth’s theory of the competitive logic (2007, 2010) does not suffer from these 
deficiencies. The weakness of this theory, however, is the lack of existing with-in case studies 
that have tested whether this causal mechanism is indeed at work. This thesis will therefore 
scrutinize her work by means of a within-case analysis to further investigate the intervening 
variables that are an inherent part of the theory’s causal chain. That will be the primary 
contribution of this thesis.  
In order to be more precise on which aspects of her theory need to be subjected to 
more thorough investigation and testing, this thesis presents here the causal chain that I 
derived from Chenoweth’s theory of the competitive logic. 
 
Figure 1: Causal path of the Theory of the Competitive Logic 
 
 
 The causal path as depicted in chart 1 demonstrates the theory. However, the causal 
inferences (the arrows) are still highly contested, for it is unknown under which exact 
circumstances each different step occurs. Indeed, under many circumstances interest groups 
do not decide to use violence as a political tool, making it more worthwhile to illuminate the 
causal mechanism that does produce a proliferation of terrorist groups and incidents.  
Moreover, as is demonstrated by the chain, the path does not account for a decrease in the 
number of domestic terrorist groups.  
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The full causal chain subdivided in hypotheses 
This thesis presents six hypotheses that give a possible explanation of how each of the 
separate steps in the ‘path causality’ comes about. Each of the hypotheses is derived from 
Chenoweth’s theory and is framed as a directly observable mechanism. Such a design is well 
suited to research the causal mechanism. I will elaborate more on this claim in the following 
chapter (‘research design’). 
 
Step 1: formation of interest groups 
 Since Chenoweth’s account is derived from more general social mobilization theory, 
the very first step in the causal process ultimately leading towards the proliferation and 
prevalence of domestic terrorism concerns the formation of citizens into interest groups. 
Much of the research, which discusses the link between domestic terrorism and democracy, 
claims that democracies encourage citizens’ mobilization. This is because democratic 
governments respect and uphold citizens’ civil liberties and because they ensure opportunities 
for citizens to influence the public agenda and change public policy. The positive relationship 
between democracy and social mobilization is portrayed in the following first hypothesis: 
 
H1: If groups have more opportunities for political influence, then citizens are more likely to 
mobilize themselves collectively by forming interest groups to influence the public agenda. 
 
Disconfirming evidence would be that new interest groups form, without the government 
being responsive and susceptible to the various interests. Other disconfirming proof would be 
the reversed finding: that no new interest groups arise, although there are more opportunities 
for political influence. Both findings would make an alternative outcome in the first step of 
the causal process. 
 
Step 2: interest groups become competitive for public space 
 The mobilization of citizens into interest groups subsequently leads to a more 
competitive interest group sector, in which one group’s winning of space on the public agenda 
is perceived as a loss for the other group. Competition thus stems from the notion that gains of 
one group are relative to others’ failure. This leads to a competitive and possibly hostile 
environment in the polity, in which groups are pitted against other. It is still vague, however, 
under what circumstances this process of interest groups being competitive towards each 
other takes place. More specifically, what causes groups to perceive their possible loss as a 
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possible win for the other? Why can there not be a sense of compromise between the various 
interest groups? A possible explanation for this mistrust and lack of understanding between 
groups could be the government’s preference for dealing with certain interests and disregard 
for others. This leads to the second hypothesis, which infers a causal relationship between the 
government’s actions and high levels of competitiveness of the interest group sector: 
 
H2: If a government is only susceptible to a limited number of interests, then interest groups 
that strive for ignored interests are more likely to become highly competitive towards each 
other. 
 
This hypothesis thus assumes that the government (consciously or unconsciously) plays an 
important role in stirring up the tensions between various societal interest groups. 
Disconfirming evidence would be that groups are being instigated by some other external 
factor, or that they themselves are responsible for the friction amongst them due to their own 
actions. Other disconfirming evidence would be the vice-versa outcome: that the IV 
(government being insusceptible) is present, without an increase in the occurrence of 
competition. These are other possible and contradicting explanations that are in need of more 
clarification. 
 
Step 3: Competition leads to outbreak of initial violence 
 Arguably the most crucial part of Chenoweth’s causal chain, is the initial outbreak of 
violence. In other words, the moment, in which any group of citizens decides to become 
terrorists in order to advance their policy goals better and perceivably in a more effective way, 
sets in motion the cascade effect and leads to a further escalation of the number of (domestic) 
terrorist groups. Regarding the immediate cause of this outbreak of initial violence, 
Chenoweth only claims: “A terrorist campaign will usually begin with a precipitating event or 
circumstance that turns to adopting violence rather than utilizing conventional political 
means” (2007, 38). This leads to the formulation of the third hypothesis, which is directly 
derived from Chenoweth’s account: 
 
H3: If one interest group’s interest threatens to become completely marginalized due to an 
external precipitating event or circumstance, then that interest group is more likely to resort to 
violence. 
 
This leaves open what such a ‘precipitating event or circumstance’ could be. I assert that it 
has to be an event that leads to the sudden marginalization of one group’s interests. My case 
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study should illuminate what such an event could potentially be. Disconfirming evidence 
would be that the initial moment of violence did not result from some external event. An 
alternative explanation would be that intra-group dynamics play an important role in the 
group’s decision to become violent. An interest group leader, for instance, can play a 
meaningful role in the groups’ decision to use violence. Also, I argue that it is worthwhile to 
examine how long a political organization used conventional means before they initiated 
violence. My argument is that interest groups that have a long history of using conventional 
means in the ‘political arena’ are more likely to stick to these means out of habit although it 
might be rational not to do so. It is therefore also interesting to examine for how long an 
interest group was in existence before it started using violence as a political tool. 
 Alternative disconfirming evidence would be the reversed outcome: namely that there 
is a ‘precipitating event or circumstance’, but that there is no occurrence of violence. This 
finding would be detrimental to Chenoweth’s theory, because the alleged connection between 
inter-group dynamics and an outbreak of violence is the centrepiece on which her account is 
built on. If an interest groups decides to stick to conventional means of action, even if the 
polity is at its maximal level of ‘saturation’ and its interests are maximally degraded, then the 
theory of competitive logic requires fundamental re-thinking. 
 
Step 4: The cascade effect 
 The next step in Chenoweth’s account is a defining feature of her theory. She claims 
that groups are not only responsive to the government but also towards each other. Because 
they are involved in a zero-sum conflict game with one another, they will likewise resort to 
violence as a low cost rational decision. Consistent with Chenoweth’s theory, this ‘cascade 
effect’ will also be tested through the fourth hypothesis: 
 
H4: If one interest group resorts to the initial use of violence, then other interest groups are 
more likely to also resort to violence to compensate for the sudden significant decrease in 
attention received on the public agenda. 
 
Disconfirming evidence would be that a terrorist group escalates its attacks, without any 
groups responding by using violence to counterbalance the initial escalation. It is also useful 
to examine not only an increase in numbers of groups, but also an increase numbers of 
incidents. Do interest groups react differently to a group, which has a long history of violence, 
or will one relative low-key attack suffice for others to also escalate their means to the use of 
violence? In addition, it should be considered whether the type of violence and type of 
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terrorist organization matter in terms of whether or not it triggers a violent counter-balancing 
reaction from other groups. It would be logically sound to suggest that groups of an opposing 
ideology have much greater incentive to adopt violent strategies (Chenoweth 2007, 47). 
 
Step 5: A decrease in numbers of group and incidents?  
 A weakness of Chenoweth’s account is that her theory has difficulties with explaining 
and predicting a decrease both in the number of terrorist groups and the number of incidents. 
To offer an explanation for these events, I will test two hypotheses, which give two different 
explanations for a sudden decrease in the number of incidents. This thesis will primarily focus 
on a decline in incidents and less so on a decline in numbers, because I contend that 
fluctuations in the number of incidents happen at a relatively fast rate, while the difference in 
the number of groups overtime generally is not that variable. Studying a sudden significant 
increase or drop in terrorist incidents is thus more meaningful, since it is easier to infer 
causality from any sudden change. The possible explanations are laid out in the following 
fifth and sixth hypotheses: 
 
H5: If a government decides to compromise on all the various interest groups’ demands, then 
interest groups are more likely to cease their acts of violence. 
 
H6: If the number of terrorist interest groups and incidents peaks, then domestic terrorist 
interest groups are more likely to cease their acts of violence due to the ‘terrorism taboo’. 
 
H5, just like H2, assumes an important role for the government in not only the proliferation 
but also the diminishment of domestic terrorist activity. Possibly terrorist groups cease their 
violent perpetrations when the government ‘bows’. Consequently, any confirming evidence 
indicates that domestic terrorism can pay off. Alternatively, it could be the case that the finite 
rate of terrorism is not caused by some external entity such as the government, but because of 
moral objections that group themselves may have towards the use of violence. As the 
population in democracies often is not understanding at all about acts of terrorism, extremist 
groups could find themselves in a situation, in which their acts are so against the norm (‘the 
terrorism taboo’) that they might conclude, out of moral objections, to stop the violence and 
to either dissolve or to turn to conventional means again (Chenoweth 2007, 250). 
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Overview of variables 
As this thesis will trace an entire causal process, there multiple intervening variables in each 
of the steps that need to be investigated. The analysis starts with the independent variable (IV) 
that stands at the very beginning of the causal ‘path’. 
 
Independent Variable  
- IV: The democratic freedom of association 
 
Dependent Variables 
Ultimately, the outcome of interest of this thesis is twofold. I am not only interested in 
examining an increase of group proliferation, but also in what causes changes in the number 
of incidents. Therefore I present two dependent variables (DVs): 
 
- DV1: Number of domestic terrorist groups 
- DV2: Number of domestic terrorist incidents by groups 
 
Intervening variables  
As this thesis aims to identify the full ‘path of causality’, I therefore derive a sequential chain 
of intervening variables that are expected to ultimately lead to the DVs. In accordance with 
the hypotheses, I will examine the following intervening variables (InterVs), which express 
the consecutive steps in the final outcome of interest: 
 
- InterV1: Formation of interest groups 
- InterV2: Government’s susceptibility to a limited number of interests 
- InterV3: Competitiveness of interest groups 
- InterV4: External precipitating event  
- InterV5: Likeliness to resort to initial violence 
- InterV6: Likeliness to become violent as reaction to initial violence 
- InterV7: Government’s willingness to compromise 
- InterV8: Absolute peak in terrorist groups and incidents at given moment 
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Chapter 4: Research Design 
  
I have discussed the need to unravel the full causal mechanism in Chenoweth’s theory 
by which an domestic interest group, which formed itself as a consequence of citizens’ civil 
liberty to do so, may use violence and thus become terroristic to influence public policy. In 
addition, I stipulated the need to further examine how these groups respond to each other, and 
by which causal mechanism groups might cease their violent perpetrations. The starting point 
for analysis is examining democratic competition, which is the fundamental determinant of 
the proliferation of domestic terrorist groups according to Chenoweth. Also, I extend the 
research interest to investigating changes in the number of incidents, and thus not just the 
number of groups. 
 
Operationalization of key intervening variables 
 In her doctoral dissertation, Chenoweth (2007) established through a large N-study a 
significant positive relationship between inter-group competition (IV) and terrorist group 
proliferation (DV). Her indicators for inter-group competition were all statically quantified 
indexes (Chenoweth 2007, 57-62): 
- Participation competition (parcomp); operationalized as the level of agenda openness 
based on level of citizens’ civil and human rights, derived from the POLITY IV dataset 
score; 
- Ideological intensity of group competition (compindx); operationalized as the degree of 
ideological heterogeneity in a given year (communist, nationalist, religious, right-wing 
reactionary, racist). 
Although this operationalization gave her the possibility to execute a large N-study in order to 
establish correlation between the key IV and DV, such indexes lack the nuances that naturally 
exist in each different country that has experienced domestic terrorism. 
 Therefore this thesis will operationalize my interVs in a way that captures the 
variation of the variables more thoroughly:  
- InterV2: expressions from government conveyed through communiqués, speeches by 
political leaders, government legislation, scholarly analysis on post-junta Greece; 
- InterV3: expressions from interest groups conveyed through communiqués, public 
statements, and presence or absence of hostile incidents directed towards other groups; 
- InterV7: government communiqués, speeches by political leaders, government 
legislation; 
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Furthermore, InterV1, InterV4, interV5, interV6 and InterV8 are operationalized quantifiably: 
- InterV1: numbers of formed groups10 
- InterV4: absence or presence of an event   
- InterV5 and InterV6: absence of presence of an attack by a group  
- InterV8: an absolute peak in incidents in certain time frame  
 
Operationalization of outcome of interest 
The data for the DVs are taken from two databases: 
- The Global Terrorism Database (‘National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism’). It is composed by the University of Maryland includes terrorist 
group profiles from the period 1970 till 2012. The date of group formation and its 
ideological background are also mentioned. It also contains data on the known terrorist 
incidents for which the respective group is responsible. GTD is renowned for its data 
richness (it is comprised of more than 125,000 incidents of terrorism). Therefore it is 
used to compose the annual Global Terrorism Index, published by the global non-profit 
Institute for Economics and Peace. In addition to its data richness, GTD offers the 
possibility to filter out specific data from specific countries and time frames.11 
- The TRAC Database (‘Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium’). This consortium is 
a supplement of the GTD. TRAC also offers an overview of terrorist groups since the 
1960s.12 In addition, it offers analytical and evaluating articles on terrorism worldwide.  
 
The GTD defines terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a 
non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, 
or intimidation”13 Practically, this means that the GTD only includes an incident in its 
selection when all three of the following attributes are met:  
1. The incident must be intentional; 
2. The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Quantitative data on interest groups for the period 1973-1983 is limited. Empirical research on Greek civil 
society did not commence until the 1990s. Eurostat, a profound data source of the European Commission, does 
have information on the organized voluntary activity of Greeks, but only started to collect data after Greece’s 
accession to the European Community in 1981. Therefore, I rely primarily on general statements about the 
emergence of Greek interest groups. 
11 GTD accessed online (December 18th, 2014): http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/process_request.asp 
12 TRAC accessed online (December 18th, 2014): http://www.trackingterrorism.org/groups 
13 Definition cited from the GTD Codebook, p.8; accessed online (December 18th, 2014): 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf 
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3. The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.14 
This definition does not differ substantially from my working definition of terrorism. 
 
Sometimes the GTD did not clarify when a group was formed or when it was dissolved. Most 
of those profiles simply state that the group is currently ‘inactive’. In that case, I relied on the 
dates of the first and last attack of the organization as the respective dates of formation and 
dissolution. 
The GTD is well suited for terrorism research. Nevertheless, there are some reliability 
concerns that need to be addressed. Firstly, we cannot know for sure whether data on groups 
or incidents may be omitted from the dataset simply because they were unreported. 
Unfortunately, this is an issue that is nearly impossible to resolve. Secondly, GTD does not 
distinguish between domestic and transnational incidents, in the sense that it includes any 
attack that occurred on a country’s territory, even if the attack was not directed at the 
government of the respective state. Therefore, I have made sure that every group under 
examination meets the requirement which I have outlined that are needed to count as a valid 
domestic terrorist group.  
 
Case selection for within-case analysis 
In order to test the hypotheses, this thesis has selected studying the case of modern 
post-authoritarian Greece. From the outset, Chenoweth’s theory of competitive logic should 
also apply to this case. According to POLITY IV data (which measures the democracy level 
of countries from -10 – +10 range), Greece ascends from a -7 score (autocracy) in 1974 to a 
spectacular +8 score in 1977.15 After 1977, Greece’s democracy level score stabilizes and 
remains between +8 and +10. 
 Meanwhile, Greece has witnessed a continuous fluctuating flow of domestic terrorist 
activity from multiple terrorist groups since its complex democratization process, which 
commenced in 1974. This pattern is peculiar, since one could expect that democratization, and 
the subsequent guarantees for civil and human rights, would give less incentive for aggrieved 
citizens to express their dissatisfaction with public policy violently. Figure 2.1 illustrates this 
puzzling increase in terrorist activity in Greece, which experienced its first peak just a few 
years after the democratization period commenced: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Idem. 
15 Greece’s POLITY IV data were accessed through: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/grc2.htm  
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Figure 2.1: Number of terrorist incidents in Greece (1970-2013, N=1154)16 
 
 
In accordance with the increase in the number of terrorist increase in Greece in the mid-
1970s, figure 2.217 likewise indicates an increase in the total number of Greek domestic 
terrorist organizations: 
 
 
 
Both figures suggest that there is a certain pattern in the cycle of terrorist proliferation and 
diminishment. The period 1973-1983 is of great interest. In terms of the total number of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Figure taken from GTD: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=greece&sa.x=-424&sa.y=-
208&sa=Search (accessed December 18th, 2014) 
17 Data taken from GTD and TRAC 
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terrorist incidents and groups, there is a sudden unprecedented rise observable in the period 
1973-1977. The puzzling increase of the values of the number of terrorist groups and 
incidents coincides with the moment that Greece transitioned to a modern democracy. Such a 
decisive event could have a large impact on the proliferation of domestic terrorism in Greece. 
Whereas the number of groups continues to rise until its peak in 1981, the level of incidents 
decreases after 1977. This is a second puzzling pattern that requires analysis.  
By focusing on a longer period of time that contains variation in levels of the DV, my 
case selection is not biased to manipulate the desired outcome of interest. This ‘terrorist 
cycle’, together with its sudden transition to modern democracy, makes Greece makes an 
interesting longitudinal case study.  
 
Method of analysis 
 As a tool for testing and evaluating the causal chain proposed in this thesis, and as a 
way to systematically reformulate and rule out alternative explanations, this thesis will use 
Collier’s process tracing method. Collier (2011, 824) defines this method of analysis as “An 
analytical tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of 
evidence – often understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena” (Collier 
2011, 824). Process tracing is a preferred analysis method since it can help making systematic 
causal inferences about both singular and recurring events. Careful and thorough description 
of these events is essential to successfully execute the process tracing method. As it traces and 
analyses the process of overtime change and causation, it thus also “fails if the phenomena 
observed at each step in this trajectory are not adequately described” (Collier 2011, 823). 
 In order to evaluate my explanatory hypotheses, discovering alternative explanations 
and other causal chains, and assessing and scrutinizing these assertions, it is not only 
important give an extensive descriptive historical narrative overtime. According to Collier 
(2011), for a full causal chain process to be properly outlined, “We must be able to 
characterize key steps in the process, which in turn permits good analysis of change and 
sequence” (Collier 2011, 824). Therefore the events in Greece should not only be marked as a 
set of interlinked ‘snap shots’ of specific moments in time, which formulate the chronological 
order by which causal mechanism of Chenoweth’s theory plays out. To test the hypotheses, 
this thesis will analyse these claims as follows: 
1. Describing the historical narrative of the Greek democratization process and the 
events that preceded the social mobilization and subsequent emergence of domestic 
terrorism in Greece. 
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2. Outlining the various emerged terrorist groups and the attacks they perpetrated in the 
course of the period 1973-1983. 
3. Zooming in on active terrorist groups and tracing the key phases of their evolvement 
into a fully developed terrorist organization. This process is to be assessed on the basis 
of each of my hypotheses, which have construed the anticipated causal mechanism. In 
practice, it means that I will gauge whether the predicted levels of the InterVs and/or 
DVs and the expected chronological order are present. 
 
The evidence that is needed to evaluate the variables will be assessed and structured by asking 
questions such as:18 
- Which interest groups emerged and what are their ideological positions? 
- Which terrorist group emerged and what are their ideological positions? 
- What did the group do? 
- What did the group say/express publically? 
- What did the government do? 
- How did the government respond? 
I recognize the challenges that are inherently part of this method. In the first place, there is the 
issue of limited available data: “both terrorist groups and governments are fairly secretive 
about their strategies and tactics. (…) Secondly, it is difficult to discern actual motives from 
stated motives” (Chenoweth 2007, 94). 
Once the descriptive inferences are completed in the analysis, I can go over the 
various hypotheses and subject them to empirical tests.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 These questions are based on Chenoweth (2007, 93-94), who asked herself roughly the same questions.  
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Chapter 5: Analysis 
  
 This part of the thesis aims to address the general research question of this thesis from 
an empirical perspective – why was there an increase in domestic terrorist activity despite the 
1974 democratization process that should have brought less incentive for citizens to become 
violent, and why did it decline only a few years later? Before analysing the causal 
mechanisms that are associated with Chenoweth’s theory of the competitive logic, I shall first 
present a descriptive chronological overview of the turbulent socio-political situation in 
Greece before and during the process of democratization, for, as Kassimeris argues, 
“Revolutionary behaviour cannot be studied apart from its socio-political and ideological 
environment” (2013, 9).  
 
Historical narrative of events prior to democratization process 
 To get a deeper understanding of the rise of domestic terrorism after the fall of the 
dictatorial regime in 1974, we need to go back in time, as Greece’s turbulent national history 
after World War II is irrefutably linked to periods of deeply rooted and even institutionalized 
mistrust, hatred and violence between a far-reaching ideological cleavage within the Greek 
society and elite. “Greece had for decades been riven by deep splits between Right and Left 
under governments dominated by the Right, and experienced numerous periods of political 
instability; from civil war, to military revolts, to periods of military and authoritarian rule” 
(Xenakis 2012, 439) 
 
From civil war to repression to reform to dictatorship 
The profound divide between the right-wing conservative and authoritarian rule, and 
leftist activist subset of the population has its foundation as early as the mid 1920s. Here is 
where the first struggles between the political elite and the working class arose. Subsequently, 
in the aftermath of World War II these increasing tensions culminated into a traumatic civil 
war (1946-1949) that has left many open wounds and bitterness amongst the Greek. There no 
accurate casualty estimations, but there is some consensus that the death toll amongst the 
Greek populace has to be around 60,000-100,000 (Close 2002, 37-39; Siani-Davies and 
Katsikas 2009, 563; Kassimeris 2013, 10). This tragedy, as Kassimeris (2013, 10) argues, 
inflicted deep political and social that have still not fully healed. 
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Eventually, with the help of American military and economical aid, the anti-
communist side of the conflict prevailed, leading to a vengeful systematic discrimination and 
exclusion by the victors (the Right) against the vanquished (the Left). This sharp divide 
arguably was the main element of social, economical and political life in Greece, which lasted 
for about thirty years (Kassimeris 2013, 10; Fakitsas 2003, 10). Weary of any more gruesome 
fighting, the 1950s were a period of relative stability, which was sustained by fearsome police 
intimidation and harassment of leftist activists. Any resistance was harshly smothered by the 
parakratos, which were extremist paramilitary organizations that presumably had close ties 
with the feared state security authorities. Until 1974, the Central Service of Information 
(KYP), the Greek secret service kept large files of on almost all citizens, and Greeks were 
assorted into two categories, namely the ethnikofrones (‘healthy’, nationally minded) and the 
miasmata (‘unhealthy, dangerous enemies of the state and society) (Siani-Davies and Katsikas 
2009, 564; Close 2009, 89). The Greek state had a modern constitution and formally upheld 
democratic values. However, the rigid institutionalized cleavage between left and right 
remained insurmountable. A series of special para-constitutional legislations (laws 509/1947, 
which also banned the Greek Communist Party (KKE), and 516/1948 in particular) operated 
alongside and in violation with the constitution. They authorized state control over the 
miasmata and upheld the sharp societal and political divide in Greece. All and all, the 
situation led to a political culture engrained with hatred and mistrust (Xenakis 2012, 439; 
Kassimeris 2013, 10-12; Fakitsas 2003, 10; Samatas 1986, 35). 
In 1963, the centrist President Papandreou was elected and advocated the notion that 
liberal measures were better able to control communism than harsh repression. He attempted 
to reform the Greek state in the early 1960s (Close 2002, 106-107; Siani-Davies and Katsikas 
2009, 564-565; Fakitsas 2003, 10; Kassimeris 2013, 11). The Greek Army, which 
traditionally had close ties to the authoritarian Greek Rightist state regime, anxiously sought 
to prevent any wave of liberal progressiveness within the realm of Greek politics, as a more 
powerful parliament would distort the old political order. Fearing any new distribution of 
power, the Army, led by ‘Colonel’ George Papadopoulos, decided just before the scheduled 
elections of 1967 to intervene. The coup d’état, which occurred swiftly by surprise on the 21st 
April, 1967, was effective. The military junta seized power and avertedly turned its back to 
parliamentary rule. The junta no longer viewed parliament’s role as the protector and 
arbitrator of the Greek ruling class (Fakitsas 2003, 11). 
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The 1974 ‘Metapolitefsi’   
However, after seven years of military dictatorship, the junta’s failure to establish, at 
least an appearance of, legitimacy as the righteous expression of the general Greek interest 
became apparent. The dissatisfaction amongst many (primarily Leftist-orientated) Greek 
citizens culminated into massive national strikes and student uprisings in November 1973, 
who were outraged about the junta’s control on the universities (Close 2002, 122). The harsh 
repression from the junta that followed also alienated the remaining conservative supporters 
of the Colonels (Sotiropoulos 2010, 451). 
Although the regime by now was completely delegitimized, the uprisings did not 
cause the fall of the regime. In the end this happened as a result of its own inability to 
counter-battle the Turkish invasion of northern Cyprus. Incapable of accomplishing any 
successful policy, combined with internal disagreements led the junta to annul its own 
position of power (Sotiropoulos 2010, 451). It summoned the pre-junta beloved Prime 
Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis from exile to manage the transition to civilian rule and to 
form a temporal government of national unity. Shortly after, in October 1974, Karamanlis 
formed the centre right-wing New Democracy (ND). On 17th of November, exactly one year 
after the infamous Athens Polytechnic University revolt, the first (free) elections were held 
after the seven-year rule of the junta. In Greek political history, this 1974 transition from an 
authoritarian regime to a reformist multiparty democracy has come to be known as 
‘Metapolitefsi’ in Greek. As figure 5 demonstrates, Karamanlis and his centre-right New 
Democracy won a landslide victory, with the centrists (EK-ND) second, the socialist PASOK 
(Panhellenic Socialist Movement) third and the communist coalition EDA-KKE fourth. The 
electoral system  by design facilitated the formation of majority single-party government. ND 
received a little more than half of the votes, but occupied 72% of the seats in parliament (216 
of 300) Sotiropoulos 2010, 456). 
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Table 1: Results of Greek Parliamentary Election of 1974 19 
Party Votes % 
New Democracy (ND) 2,669,133 54.4 
Centre Union – New Forces (EK-ND) 
(continuation of former EK which held 
power in the early sixties before the 
military junta) 
1,002,559 20.4 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) 666,413 13.6 
United Left (coalition EDA-KKE, center 
left and communist party) 464,787 9.5 
National Democratic Union (EDE), 
extreme right 52,768 1.1 
 
 
 Now that a general historical narrative has been provided on the political 
developments in Greece before Metapolitefsi, it is now essential to test the causal mechanism 
as suggested by Chenoweth’s theory of the competitive logic. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Domestic terrorist group emergence in Greece (1967-1983) 20 
 
Year of 
Emergence Name of Group Ideology 
Year of 
dissolution 
Total 
Number 
of 
Reported 
Attacks* 
Total 
Groups 
1967 Free Greeks 
Nationalist/ 
separatist 
1974 unknown 1 
1968     1 
1969     1 
1970 Makriyannis Fighting Group Leftist 
1971  
(merged with 
LEA) 
0 2 
1971 
Popular Revolutionary 
Resistance Group (LEA) 
Leftist 1972 1 2 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Results taken from: Nohlen and Stover, 2010. “Elections in Europe, a Data Handbook”: 830. 
20 Data taken from GTD and TRAC (see Research Design) 
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1972 
Resistance, Liberation and 
Independence Organization 
(AAA) 
Anti-American 1972 1 2 
1973 
Greek Anti-Dictatorial Youth 
(EAN) 
Nationalist/ 
separatist 
1973 1 1 
1974 Greek Anti-Regime 
Movement (LAOS-11) 
Nationalist/ 
separatist 
1974 1 1 
1975 Revolutionary People’s Struggle (ELA) 
Anti-globalist/ 
Communist 1995 90 1 
” Revolutionary Organization 17 November (RO17N) 
Anti-globalist/ 
Communist/ 
Nationalist 
2001 114 2 
1976     2 
1977 
Greek National Socialist 
Organization 
Fascist 1978 3 3 
” Fighting Popular Rally unknown 1977 7 4 
” Kentavros unknown 1977 1 5 
1978 
Organization for National 
Recovery (OEA) 
Rightist/ 
Conservative 
1978 unknown 4 
” Group June 1978 
Anti-Globalist/ 
Communist/ 
Nationalist 
1980 3 5 
1979 Group Popular Resistance anarchist 1979  6 
1980 Golden Dawn (Chrysi Avyi) Fascist/Racist 
2005  
(merged with 
Patriotic Alliance) 
unknown 5 
” 
New October 1980 
Revolutionary Organization 
(EO80O) 
Anti-Globalist/ 
Leftist 
1981 2 6 
1981 Blue Archer Group (GT) 
Rightist/ 
Conservative 
1981 unknown 5 
” 
Revolutionary Anti-Capitalist 
Initiative (RACI) 
Anarcho- 
Communist 
1981 unknown 6 
” Revolutionary Nucleus Communist 1981 1 7 
” 
Autonomous Resistance 
Group (AA) 
Leftist 1981 2 8 
1982     5 
1983 
Greek National Socialist 
Struggle 
Fascist/Racist 1983 1 6 
*This number presented in this chart is based on data from the GTD. However, the real 
number of terrorist incidents could be higher. The problem of underreporting of terrorism 
prohibits the provision of actual numbers of total terrorist incidents. 
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Testing of hypotheses: tracing the causal mechanism in the case of ELA and RO17N  
As evidenced by table 2, of all the domestic organizations that emerged, two ultra-left 
terrorist groups, which both emerged shortly after the commencement of Metapolitefsi, stand 
out: ELA (Epanastatikos Laikos Agonas) and RO17N. Whereas the vast majority of emerged 
groups in the 1970s and early 1980s were short-lived in terms of their early demise and 
number of attacks, these two groups managed to remain vigorous perpetrators of terrorist acts 
for almost 30 years. This thesis therefore will primarily zoom in at the emergence of far-leftist 
interest groups and its ties with the communist ELA and RO17N. It will trace the key phases 
of their evolvement into fully developed terrorist organizations in the 1970s. This process is 
to be assessed on the basis of each of the hypotheses.  
 
Phase 1: Democracy (freedom of association) leads to formation of more interest groups (H1) 
 On 23rd July 1974, the dictatorial military officially surrendered power. Since the junta 
regime did not fall directly as a result from popular pressure, despite the strikes and uprisings 
of November 1973, it was junta official and self-proclaimed ‘head of state’ General Gizikis 
who swore in Karamanlis. Aware of the ambiguity of Gizikis’ legitimacy, as his position was 
derived from usurped power, Karamanlis quickly issued the Constitutional Decree of 1st 
August 1974. This act restored the Constitution of 1952, with the exception of the articles that 
referred to Greece as a ‘Crowned Democracy’. Karamanlis’ decree left the decision on the 
future of the monarchy open to a referendum. It was the first Act of constitutional value and 
therefore the first step in the process of Metapolitefsi and the return of legality in Greece 
(Katsoudas 1987, 19-20; Clogg 1987, 61-62). 
 Eventually, following the November 1974 elections, the new Greek constitution came 
into force in 1975. It was of republican nature and included all the rights and guarantees for 
popular sovereignty (Art. 1 and 2). In terms of the civil rights to assemble and associate, the 
legal environment for Greek interest groups was positive and fairly enabling, as is evidenced 
by the 1975 constitution21: 
 
Art. 11.  
1. Greeks have the right to assemble peaceably and without arms as the law provides. 
(…) 
 Art. 12. 
1. Greeks shall have the right to form non- profit associations and unions, in compliance with 
the law, which, however, may never subject the exercise of this right to prior permission.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 English translation of original text cited from: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-
49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/001-156%20aggliko.pdf 
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2. An association may not be dissolved for violation of the law or of a substantial provision of 
its statutes, except by court judgment.  
3. The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall apply, as the case may be, to unions of 
persons not constituting an association. (…) 
Freedom of association was thereby guaranteed. Within the provision as set by Greek law, 
any state-autonomous interest group may be founded, its legality cannot depend on prior 
approval of state authorities, and only by decision of a court of law could any association 
potentially be dissolved (Kohler 1982, 137). 
The fall of the Colonels’ regime was followed by the re-establishment of a 
parliamentary system that included the legalized Communist Party. This ended the 
institutionalized discrimination of primarily leftist political groupings and meant the 
strengthening of the rights of free speech and free association. In terms of political rights, 
these were enhanced as a result of the abolition of the monarchy, the safeguards installed 
against a future interference by the army in parliamentary politics, the elimination of electoral 
fraud and the termination of repressive political practices on the countryside (Mouzelis and 
Pagoulatos 2002, 8). These structural changes yielded possibilities for Greeks to associate and 
participate in voluntary, self-organized, self-supported and state-autonomous groupings of 
individuals that represent any social, political, professional or economic interests outside 
formal political circles. Combined, those groupings are commonly referred to as part of the 
‘civil society’ (Sotiropoulos 2004, 11).  
This civil society is rendered as important to any democratic transition as it can serve 
as a corps intermediaire between state and society and as a safeguard against state 
authoritarianism (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos 2002, 2). Schmitter (1986) even argues that, in 
order for any system of liberal democracy to remain a viable alternative to authoritarianism, 
“a country must possess a civil society in which certain community and group identities exist 
independent of the state” (1986, 6).  
 It is therefore not surprising that the process of democratic transition is linked to an 
outburst of social and political mobilization (Sotiropoulos 2004, 8). To what extent is this 
dynamic observed in Greece after Metapolitefsi? And, could the domestic terrorist groups be 
linked to this mobilization?  
 
Emergence of interest groups after Metapolitefsi 
 With regards to the emergence of interest groups in Greece, Fakiolas (1987) argues 
that “there are thousands of interest groups in Greece (…). The groups inevitably cover a 
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wide range of interests, from strictly economic to cultural, educational, ethnic, religious, and 
conservationist” (1987, 174). Of all these different interests, the trade unions have been the 
most prominent set of groups (Mahaira-Odoni 1995, 240). However, contrary to what would 
be expected, many of these groups already had existed before the fall of the dictatorship. For 
instance, the General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE), the prime union for the Greek 
workers of the private sector, which represents 90% of all unions, was established as early as 
1918 (Fakiolas 1987, 175). In fact, the number of groups that was established since 1974 is 
limited. The new interest groups primarily consist of a handful of strong political parties. As 
Fakiolas (1987, 175) writes: 
Among them are about two dozen political societies and discussion groups, as against about a 
dozen functioning before the dictatorship; three new peace movements, as against one before; 
half a dozen new women’s organizations; (…) about a dozen new environmental, consumer 
and TV viewers protection associations.”  
 
Can any of these interest groups be associated with ELA, RO17N or any other terrorist 
organization? Kassimeris (2005, 761) claims that the extra-pariamentary left immediately 
disassociated itself from them, since they perceived ELA and RO17N as  “avant-gardist, 
dogmatic and militaristic”. As a result, these terrorist cells viewed themselves as part of the 
Greek autonomous movement; that is to say a more or less loosely tied cell of individuals that 
“had consciously broken off links not only with the communist left and its unions (…) but 
also with the various new extra-parliamentary leftist groups” (Kassimeris 2013, 66).  This 
finding indicates that domestic terrorist groups in the 1970s never considered using 
conventional persuasive tactics to further their interests. From the outset, these groups have 
perceived their demands as to be beyond the scope of the mainstream conventional political 
arena.  
Fakiolas (1987, 175) asserts that the number of newly established interests groups 
does not signify a significant outburst in social and political mobilization as one could expect 
after a democratic transition.  This leaves the question open how this absence of mobilization 
can be explained. My argument and answer is the following: that any substantial social and 
political mobilization in Greece after Metapolitefsi was inhibited due to the continuation of an 
overbearing control of the state over the most potent interest groups and due to the 
pervasiveness of a few strong political parties. Sotiropoulos (2004) has named this situation a 
‘Greek paradox’, “Since, normally, state corporatist structures accompany authoritarian, not 
democratic political regimes” (2004, 20). 
	   43	  
How did this overbearing Greek state manifest itself after the fall of the junta and how 
did it hinder the development of interest groups? Indeed the most prominent interest groups, 
the unions, could now operate without fear of persecution and police interference. However, 
Kohler (1982, 137), Fakiolas (1987, 179) and Sotiropoulos (2004, 18) argue that after the 
transition the Greek government maintained a considerable degree of influence over the 
handful already existing labour associations. For instance, the respective ministry staffed the 
top of the various organizations by pro-government leaders. Moreover, about 80-90% of their 
income came from state subsidies granted by the Ministry of Labour, thereby ensuring a firm 
control over its finances (Kohler 1982, 138; Sotiropoulos 2004, 18). Such s system did not 
only result in far-stretching dependence upon the state, it also had a severe corrupting effect 
on peak union representatives, as it relied primarily on the personal exchange of favours. 
Strong close ties between the central state apparatus and unions inhibited the latter from 
playing an autonomous role.  Political clientelism thus failed to produce a new vibrant interest 
group sector, even though formally the legal environment was present in post authoritarian 
Greece (Mahaira-Odoni 1995, 241). 
 The Greek political culture based on patron-client relationships was the result of a 
long-term historical pattern, which can be traced back to the early 1900s. The sociologist 
Mouzelis22 (1986, 126-133) has made a compelling argument about the origins of Greek 
clientelism. He claims that this political behaviour is rooted in the delayed development of 
industry and capital. Traditionally, the Greek oligarchy, consisting of influential landowners, 
functioned as the sole employers in a predominantly agricultural society. Competing private 
employers, which would have emerged through industrialization, were practically absent. 
When the masses gradually entered the political system, they were thus naturally incorporated 
in the system in a vertical manner, since the state remained the ultimate employer and the 
organizational centre for the exchange of favours. As a consequence, “organizations neither 
managed to put a decisive check on the incorporative/paternalistic tendencies of the state, nor 
could they eliminate the all-pervasive particularistic, personalistic features of the polity” 
(Mouzelis 1986, 127). Obviously, the sudden transition to democracy in 1974 did not 
immediately end this deeply rooted aspect of the Greek political system. This historical 
development is fundamentally different from the situation in Western democracies, where 
industrialization preceded the incorporation of the masses into politics. This opened up 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 I wish to thank Dr. Vrousalis, assistant professor Political Philosophy at Leiden University for his suggestion 
to look into Mouzelis’ work. 
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opportunities for private employment, and broke off the close ties between the patron (the 
state) and the client (the masses).  
 In addition to a political culture engrained with clientelism, there is another reason 
why Metapolitefsi did not result in an outburst of mobilization. Albeit under pressure, it was 
the military junta that independently made the decision to surrender power to Karamanlis and 
parliamentary rule. The rapid regime change came by surprise. Therefore, with the exception 
of political parties, it simply did not allow for mobilization because there was no time for 
interest groups to form. The ‘window of opportunity’ was kept shut (Sotiropoulos 2004, 17). 
 Lastly, the excessive concentration of power in the hands of a few political parties also 
prevented the emergence of other interest groups. This argument is articulated by 
Sotiropoulos (2004). He contends that “A few political parties “sapped”, as it were, the 
political energies of the populace” during Metapolitefsi (2004, 17). Figure 4 illustrates the 
high interest in party politics in the 1980s: 
 
Table 3: Active participation in politics 1985-1996 23 
 
 
The major parties successfully established party-led associations in many domains, especially 
labour, and exerted heavy influence on them. Relying on the ‘old’ form of clientelistic 
exchange of political favours, the parties emerged “as the natural broker for aggregating 
interests” (Mahaira-Odoni 1995, 241). For instance, ND managed rapidly expand its party 
membership (130,000 registered members by 1979) and to set up close ties with farmers’ 
associations and large sections of the trade union leadership (Kohler 1982, 120). Above all, 
PASOK realized the importance of using interest groups effectively by placing them into the 
party mechanism (Fakiolas 1987, 183-184; Kohler 1982, 130). This evidenced by the fact that 
by the mid-1980s, PASOK had around 75,000 members, 100 local organizations, 500 sector 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Cited in: Lyberaki, Antigone and Christos J. Paraskevopoulos. 2002 “Social Capital Measurment in Greece”. 
In: OECD-ONS International Conference on Social Capital, London: 
http://www.civicus.org/new/media/CSI_Greece_Executive_Summary.pdf  
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organizations and 700 smaller party-affiliated groups (Kohler 1982, 130. Sotiropoulos (2004) 
even claims that PASOK, in particular, “orchestrated the synchronization of government and 
almost all labour and professional associations, so as to acquire full-control over civil society, 
in the manner the Nazi party had in inter-war Germany” (2004, 18). 
This explains why nearly all interest groups that emerged had such strong affiliation 
with political parties. Also, it explains why the new extra-parliamentary groups remained 
rather insignificant in terms of their influence in the political realm. They lacked the resources 
and public appeal to the broader public as this was ‘sapped’ by tight party-led organizations. 
This bold concentration of power simply did not allow for any other interests to be heard in 
the polity. 
This evidence disconfirms H1. In fact, it gives proof for an alternative finding: that the 
right to associate guaranteed due to Metapolitefsi (IV) did not result in any substantial 
thriving and vigorous independent interest group sector (InterV1) to proliferate. My analysis 
suggests the interference of two omitted variables, namely state control over interest group 
sector and, closely linked, the power concentration of political parties, which have prevented 
the proliferation of interest groups. Regarding the first signs of the proliferation of domestic 
terrorism, my analysis also signifies that none of the interest groups that did emerge after 
Metapolitefsi had any direct links to terrorist organizations like ELA or RO17N. 
 Lastly, it appears that in the case of Greece democracy’s freedom of association (IV) 
as explanatory factor is not a valid necessary condition in the causal chain. It prompts that the 
IV is not a necessary variable for setting in motion the sequence of events that will eventually 
lead to the DVs. These events will be further explored hereafter. 
 
Phase 2: As the Greek government ignored many interest groups’ demands, these groups 
become more competitive towards each other (H2) 
 
As the first post-junta liberal government, top priority for the Karamanlis government 
was to advance the process of ‘Apohountopoiisi’, or de-juntification. The new prime minister 
declared that from now on there would be “Room for all Greeks” in “A genuine and 
progressive democracy” (The Times, July 26th 1974: Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 567). 
The severe oppression by the junta forced the new government to lay the foundations for 
thorough political and societal reconciliation through the pursuit of the administration of 
transitional justice. As a consequence, balancing out the interests of the traditional Left and 
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Right, which had had such a long history of mistrust and violence towards each other, was a 
key assignment for Karamanlis (Xenakis 2012, 440; Sotiropoulos 2010, 452).  
Indeed, Karamanlis moved swiftly to reinstate fundamental freedoms. However, 
elsewhere, his approach to de-juntification was much more conservative and cautious. 
Karamanlis remained hesitant about the ‘cleansing’ of the state apparatus of the civil servants 
that served under the Colonels’ regime (Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 567; Sotiropoulos 
2010, 452; Kassimeris 2005, 750-751): only 200 of the 100,000 junta supporters that held 
important positions within the state were removed (Kyriakatiki Eleftherotypia (Greek 
newspaper), July 29th 1975: Kassimeris 205, 751). Karamanlis did not want to alienate the 
military at a time of great military tensions over Cyprus with neighbouring Turkey. Moreover, 
he faired a destabilizing effect of punitive policies, and, lastly, he was aware that most Greeks 
had in fact never resisted the junta. As Karamanlis declared in an interview (Sotiropoulos 
2010, 457): 
 
“As for the demands for a more widespread purge (…) half the Greek population would be in 
jail if I had not stood out against it.”  
 
He re-emphasized his commitment to this view in 1975 when he announced to reduce the 
death sentence for the junta’s leaders and to commute them to life imprisonment: 
 
“When we say life imprisonment, we mean life imprisonment” (Greek newspaper Ta Nea: 
issue August 30th, 1975: Sotiropoulos 2010, 457) 
 
All political parties demanded the process of de-juntification. However, to what extent 
the transitional justice had to be administered, differed substantially.  
New Democracy fully supported the view of the popular and dominating leader 
Karamanlis. On the contrary, the socialist PASOK fiercely opposed the government’s view. 
Its leader Papandreou demanded harder punitive action and dismissed Karamanlis’ argument 
that the opposition ought to be, in principle, against capital punishment (Greek newspaper I 
Avgi, issue: August 26th 1975; Greek newspaper Rizospastis, issue: August 26th 1975: 
Sotiropoulos 2010, 457). 
The communist left, which turned out be of little political threat after the 1974 election 
results, were internally split in a Euro-communist-faction and a ‘classical’ Moscow-line 
faction. Although they had lived through systematic suppression for so long, paradoxically, 
the KKE “was not as determined as PASOK to impose the most severe sentences possible 
	   47	  
against those involved in the 1967 coup, the suppression of the 1973 uprising and the torture 
of resistance members” (Sotiropoulos 2010, 458). They refrained from reacting fiercely 
against Karamanlis’ de-juntification, since they were more preoccupied with pressing for a 
full re-instauration of democracy, with the systematic oppression that faced in the 1950s and 
1960s. Their minimal electoral strength did not put them into a position to use aggressive ant-
Karamanlis rhetoric (Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 567). 
How did the new extra-parliamentary leftist interest groups and communist terrorist 
groups react to the Karamanlis government’s reluctance to proceed with de-juntification and 
deliver the irreversible change that the Left had fervently demanded? According to 
Kassimeris (2005, 751), they felt guilty that they had not undertaken sufficient action prior to 
Metapolitefsi, and felt convinced that the time had come to finally ensure structural 
revolutionary change and social justice for the working class. 
ELA and RO17N, as is evidenced by published manifestos and court testimonies, were 
outraged with the government’s conservative stance towards de-juntification. Tsigaridas, an 
ELA head figure who in 2009 stood trail for his terrorist acts, explained how little the 
Karamanlis regime actually differed and how much it was just a continuation of the same 
state authority under a different name and under different deceptive symbols and a 
constitution: 
[The Karamanlis regime] “Did everything it could to leave Greek people in no doubt that it 
helped to facilitate a dynastic about-turn, a real change within the elite political personnel of a 
capitalist state power. Apart from the junta leaders, all the key people that made up the junta 
state apparatus remained unpunished. Not even an elementary catharsis of the state 
mechanisms was attempted. All the appointees of, and collaborators with, the junta in state 
bureaucracy, the police apparatus, education and the judiciary remained untouched” 
[Excerpt from court testimony of ELA head figure Christos Tsigaridas, delivered 29th 
October, 2009] (Kassimeris 2013, 64)  
 
For this reason ELA also despised the notion of Metapolitefsi. They viewed it as no 
more than a democratic farce; a well-developed and well-played out trick by the Greek elite to 
deceive the Greek people into thinking that their dreams of social justice and equality would 
now become reality. In his same testimony, Tsigaridas referred to it is a mere deceiving 
cosmic change: 
 
“The dictatorship was finished by the same powers which had imposed it in the first place; 
Metapolitefsi was a cosmetic change imposed by the Americans and NATO. (…) mainstream 
parties made certain that any popular scepticism was channelled to harmless for the system 
directions, while at the same time a new political establishment was created to run the 
capitalist socioeconomic system”  
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[Excerpt from court testimony of ELA head figure Christos Tsigaridas, delivered 29th 
October, 2009] (Kassimeris 2013, 63) 
 
With regards to the communist stance on the matter, ELA believed that the KKE had betrayed 
and mistreated the interests of the Greek working class by accepting Karamanlis’ position: 
 
 [KKE] “has abandoned illegality and underground activity – the methods of political practice 
that support and strengthen the development of the popular movement. By abandoning the 
organization and exercise of revolutionary violence, it has effectively deprived the popular 
movement of the two most preconditions for the seizure of power and the creation of 
socialism in Greece. Instead, KKE insists on organizing and promoting a political struggle 
that is reduced to a legally accepted bourgeois framework, cultivating the illusion that only 
gradual and peaceful protest can lead to revolutionary change and a fundamental break with 
advanced capitalism – something which historically has proved to be unrealizable.” 
[Excerpt from ELA manifesto ‘Yia tin anaptyxi tou Ellinikou Laikou kai Epanastatikou 
Kinimatos’ (‘For the Development of the Greek Popular and Revolutionary Movement’), 
published publically June/July 1978] 
 
In April 1977, RO17N released a 28-page manifesto, which was titled “A Response to 
Political Parties and Organizations”. They declared all Greek political parties to be 
repressive. In addition, they accused the Greek state of being “an American vassal”. Their 
purpose was to perpetrate violent campaigns against what they viewed as “a superficial 
democratic transformation” in order to change Greece (Xenakis 2012, 441; Fakitsas 2003, 
16). 
 
About its relationship with the communist party KKE, RO17N made it clear in their 
manifesto: 
 
“[…] Not only did they not carry out a single act of resistance, but at the same time they 
continued at every opportunity to denounce all those who did, which explains why 
Karamanlis legalized them” 
[Excerpt from the 17N manifesto “A Response to Political Parties and Organizations”] 
(Kassimeris 2001, 69) 
 
My analysis confirms H2. As it turns out, the Greek government ignored the demands of the 
Leftist political parties and its grassroots organizations, which demanded harsh punitive 
measures be taken to promote reconciliation and de-juntification (InterV2). This led to two 
outcomes: more competition between the socialist and the conservative political forces. It also 
lead to more competition between the traditional communists, who advocated a softer stance, 
and the autonomous revolutionary left that later brought forth ELA and RO17N. Karamanlis 
proved to be resolute in his ideas about transitional justice. Inevitably, this infuriated the Left: 
they demanded the Right to fully redeem themselves after decades of prosecution. The 
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analysis demonstrates that not only governmental actions can cause more inter-group 
competition.  
 
Phase 3: As one Greek interest group’s interests are completely marginalized due to 
precipitating event, it resorts to violence, as they perceive no other way out of the zero-sum 
conflict game (H3) 
 
 The first terrorist attack after the start of Metapolitefsi occurred on April 29th, 1975, as 
eight cars belonging the US servicemen at a military base of Elifsina were firebombed  
(Kassimeris 2013, 59). The previously unknown ELA claimed responsibly for this attack. 
What was the immediate cause for this escalation of violence?  
As outlined in the previous paragraphs, the revolutionary left was particularly outraged 
with the government’s moderate position towards de-juntification and with the communist 
party’s declining sense of radicalism and reformism. Violence was deemed the only viable 
solution to set in motion a notion of unity and consciousness amongst the working class when 
confronting the capitalist political and economical situation in Greece. In the ELA manifesto 
of 1978, the group argues that structural social change can only come about if an armed 
‘professional’ vanguard commits itself to a “long, hard and violent struggle” (Kassimeris 
2005, 758) 
These findings lead me to disconfirm the H3, on account that ELA’s reason for using 
violence did not stem from a zero-sum conflict game. There are two arguments for this 
contention. Firstly, ELA did not exist as an established interest group before it claimed 
responsibility for its first attack. In fact, ELA’s decision to adopt violence was made 
immediately upon its formation. Therefore it had never had the chance to be involved in a 
conflict game with any other interest group. Secondly, as is evidenced from their manifesto, 
the revolutionary ELA members, from the very beginning, had never contemplated using 
anything but violence to promote their interests. ELA could have attempted to use 
conventional means, but it never changed its military methods and strategies. Throughout its 
existence it sought to educate and publicize a potential message for broader public 
(Kassimeris 2005, 759). The use of violence was not perceived as an ‘ultimate way out’. 
Instead, it was deemed as a justification for its existence. 
Furthermore, my analysis does not support the notion that some external precipitating 
event (InterV4) had led to a sudden marginalization in the polity and subsequently caused the 
violent escalation (InterV5). My evidence only points at two circumstantial reasons for the 
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reason to adopt violence: fury about the government’s moderate position towards de-
juntification and the perceived KKE’s betrayal of the working class. A more immediate cause 
for violence is not found. Alternatively, I suggested in chapter 3 that intra-group dynamics, 
such as the presence of a dominating leader, could be decisive for the terrorists’ decision to 
use violence. However, ELA was far from a hierarchal leader-dominated organization. ELA 
rejected the principle of strong hierarchy and leadership (Kassimeris 2013, 67). Thus its 
organizational structure likely did not impact their intent to become violent.  
There is some preliminary support for the claim that the decision to adopt violence is 
contingent upon how long a political grouping had existed as a conventional interest groups, 
given that ELA immediately adopted violence after its formation. The reason could be that it 
had not yet accustomed itself to the conventional rules of the ‘political game’, and thus had no 
difficulty with exerting brute force. Unfortunately, findings do not evidence this claim. 
 
Phase 4: As this Greek interest group resorts to violence, other Greek groups respond by also 
resorting to violence (H4) 
 
Table 2 outlines the emergence of the various domestic terrorist organizations. It 
demonstrates that after ELA’s formation, 14 new groups emerged in 8 years. Is there any 
reason to suggest that Chenoweth’s cascade-effect has occurred? 
RO17N, which was the first group to form after ELA, committed the first attack 8 
months after ELA, when it assassinated Athens-based American CIA chief Richard Welch on 
December 23rd, 1975. Unlike ELA, which viewed terrorism as a political tool to ‘educate the 
proletariat’ before the real social and political revolution could take place, the more 
nationalist and secretive RO17N considered violence as an end in itself (Kusher 2002, 315) 
Regardless of these differences in approach, RO17N essentially had the same political agenda 
and in this sense it can be called a compatriot of ELA.  
In terms of the emergence of other groups, it is worth noting there were also four 
right-wing groups that eventually arose. This confirms the expectation that groups of an 
opposing ideology have an important incentive to become violent to counter-balance the left-
wing terrorism. 
In terms of the number incidents, figure 2.1 demonstrates that after the peak year 
1977, the number of (GTD reported) incidents gradually declined. This information suggests 
that a rising number of groups did not result in a rising number of incidents. 
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These findings suggest that there is some preliminary support for H4. The emergence 
of right-wing groups suggest some cascade-effect as these groups sought to counter-balance  
left-wing violence (interV6). However, sources that confirm this perspective are absent. 
Moreover, evidence suggests that, at least in the case of RO17N, other left-wing groups 
emerged out of support for ELA’s cause. This notion suggests that one terrorist groups could 
inspire and infuse others to strive for the same interest goals. However, this claim is only 
merely a theoretical expectation, since no source confirms it.  
 
Phase 5: There is a decrease in the number of terrorist incidents, either because the 
government compromises between the various demands, or because the groups are impacted 
by the ‘terrorism taboo’ (H5 and H6)  
 
 Although figure 2.1 demonstrates that overall the number of incidents declines sharply 
after 1977. However, according to the GTD data that are illustrated in figure 3, ELA and 
RO17N do not fall in this pattern.  
 
Figure 3: Number of reported terrorist acts perpetrated by ELA (green) and RO17N 
(red) (1973 - 1983, N=22)24 
 
How can this operational continuity be explained? ELA en RO17N never attempted to 
become broad-based movements with wide involvement of many supporters Instead, they 
relied on strong emotional bonds, which reinforced a sense of trust and silence amongst the 
members (Kassimeris 2007, 108). These intra-group dynamics likely account for their long-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Figure taken from GTD: 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=perpetrator&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start
_yearonly=1973&end_yearonly=1983&dtp2=all&country=78&perpetrator=271,582 (accessed January 9th, 
2015) 
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lived terrorist campaign. In the case of ELA and RO17N, both H5 and H6 are thus 
disconfirmed, since the DV2 (number of terrorist incidents) did not decline during the period 
under investigation. 
 Is there any evidence to suggest that the government has given in to extreme leftist or 
rightist terrorist demands, which has led other organizations to cease operations and dissolve 
themselves? Evidence actually suggests quite the opposite. In 1976 the Karamanlis 
government introduced special anti-terrorist legislation (Law 480/1976 and 495/1976) and in 
1978 it passed another law, named the “Bill to Combat Terrorism and Protect Democratic 
Polity” (Law 774/1978), which provided for severe penalties and strict court procedures for 
alleged perpetrators of terrorism25. 
  In addition, Fakiolas (2003) claims that until the mid-1980s, incidents of domestic 
terrorism were viewed “as casual events perpetrated by isolated anarchic agitators rather than 
a sustained campaign of violence” (2003, 29). In 1983, PASOK Minister of Justice Mangakis 
stated during a parliamentary debate: 
 
“What we have in this country is not terrorism but isolated episodes of terrorism like the ones 
experienced by nearly all nations, even the most peaceful as Austria and Switzerland” 
(Fakiolas 2003, 30-31) 
 
This evidence demonstrates that the Greek state not only reacted aggressively to terrorism, but 
that it also decided not to take the threat very seriously. InterV7, the government’s willingness 
to compromise, is thus completely absent. This leads me to disconfirm H5. 
 Is there evidence to suggest that any terrorist organization ceased operations due to a 
‘terrorism taboo’ as a result of a peak in terrorist violence? I have found no evidence to 
support this hypothesis. The reason for this is that all the short-lived organizations have 
operated secretively and have refrained from publicizing their message. Consequently, it is 
impossible to discern the motives for their abandoning of violence. Alternatively, they might 
have ended their campaign simply because Greek state authorities arrested them. However, 
the Greek state’s inability to curtail terrorist activity is widely recognized in the literature on 
Greece. H6 is thereby disconfirmed.   
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 According to Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/36/425, dated September 21st , 1981) 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/36/a36425.pdf 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
Main findings and arguments 
 In this thesis, I investigated the relationship between democracy and domestic 
terrorism. Data suggest that this phenomenon systematically occurs in liberal democracies, 
and even with a higher frequency than in authoritarian regimes. Moreover, there seems to be 
variation amongst democracies. Poor and transitioning democracies appear to be the most 
susceptible to terrorism within their borders. These observations are striking, since the 
prevalent rationale in the West amongst many policy-makers and experts alike is that 
democracy serves as a powerful remedy against terrorism. After all, citizens in liberal states 
have so many legal and non-violent channels to express their political preferences and to 
change undesired policy. To address this societal and scientific puzzle, this essay sought to 
unravel under what conditions citizens in democracies are motivated to engage in acts of 
terrorism against the state or their fellow citizens. 
 Construing the causal mechanism by which democracies give rise to domestic 
terrorism has sparked much scholarly debate.  I laid out three perspectives on this matter that 
have formed the major contradictions in the academic field. The third perspective, which 
associates social mobilizations of citizens into competitive interest groups, appeared the most 
promising. It explains citizens’ motivations and has potential to foreshadow waves of 
violence. Agenda competition, interest group organization and a plurality of ideas are 
elements of a democracy that can encourage terrorism.  
The exact mode by which the competitive logic plays out in democracies is absent, 
since little qualitative case studies have been conducted to examine this theory. This thesis 
sought to fill this gap and strengthen the theory by testing and further specifying the exact 
causal mechanism by which democracies give rise to terrorism. Greece’s democratization 
process was selected as a study case, because its transition period went with an unprecedented 
peak in political violence, and because the violence went through a certain cycle in time. The 
causal path, by which the two most prominent groups ELA en RO17N developed, was traced.  
 My first finding is that there was no significant outburst in social mobilization after 
the Metapolitefsi. Apart from mainly a few overbearing political parties and affiliated interest 
groups, new interest groups were barely formed. Secondly, I have found support to suggest 
that the government, by its insusceptibility to interest group demands, leads to an increased 
sense of competitiveness amongst rival political forces. Thirdly, however, my analysis does 
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not support the claim that this competiveness led to the initial adoption of violence, as the 
terrorist organization were autonomous groups that had never functioned as conventional 
interest groups, nor did they ever wish to use non-violence. Fourthly, the formation of RO17N 
cannot be explained by the theory, since no evidence suggests that it aimed to counter-balance 
ELA. However, the proliferation of right-wing groups in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
preliminary supports the notion of a cascade-effect, but this claim lacks empirical proof. 
Fifthly, ELA and RO17N’s operational continuity cannot be explained by the theory, nor can 
it account for the decline in terrorist incidents in the late 1970s. 
 Overall, my analysis disconfirms and thereby challenges the causal hypothesized 
mechanisms. There is a possibility that Greece is an ‘outlier case’. This could explain the low 
applicability of the theory. Greece makes an exceptional case because its democratization 
process did not result in an outburst of social mobilization. In fact, there hardly was an 
independent interest group sector present in post-junta Greece. This has been called the 
‘Greek paradox’. Further qualitative research should be done to assess whether Greece indeed 
is an exceptional case and whether the theory is supported in other cases that experienced 
democratic transitions in the 1970s, such as Portugal and Spain. 
 My findings illustrate a different causal mechanism that led to the formation and 
lethality of ELA and RO17N. I assert that, in the Greek case, not democracy’s commitment to 
pluralism, but rather a lack of pluralism led to a few disillusioned citizens to adopt violent 
strategies. Indeed, Greece after the Metapolitefsi formally and legally created the right 
environment for interest groups to form and was thereby committed to pluralism. However, a 
large corrupt and clientelist overbearing state, combined with the omnipresence of a few 
strong political parties immediately halted the ‘political energies’ that naturally arose after the 
fall of the junta. Even the communists in post-junta Greece did not utilize their newly 
acquired civil rights to mass-mobilize against the new elite and seemed to be satisfied with 
Karamanlis’ conservative de-juntification policies.  
 With more democracy comes the promise of equal rights and opportunities for a better 
future. In Greece, which had a political history marked by polarization, hatred and mistrust 
prior to its democratization, this better future was particularly desired by so many who had 
suffered from exclusion and discrimination. However, the aggrieved revolutionary leftists 
quickly were disillusioned when no new vibrant interest group sector emerged, and felt 
betrayed when the desired de-juntification process was not fully advanced.  They discredited 
Metapolitefsi as a mere cosmic change. They viewed it as a democratic farce designed to trick 
the masses into believing they had the promised new rights and opportunities.  
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 This disillusionment also explains why ELA and RO17N immediately adopted 
violence upon their formation, as they realized that their interests would never be heard on a 
public agenda that was overwhelmingly dominated by a handful of dominant corporatist 
political parties. Furthermore, I suggest that like-minded aggrieved citizens can inspire each 
other to also use violence. The initial violence by ELA could have sparked both RO17N and 
so many other leftist short-lived terrorist cells. This claim should be researched more 
thoroughly. 
 Also, I assert that intra-group structures are vital to understand its continuity or demise 
and should not be underestimated when explaining a pattern of incidents. ELA and RO17N, 
because they were comprised of family members and close friends, were immune to 
infiltration and could stay underground for so long. Future research should reveal if the other 
Greek terrorist organizations had a different intra-group organizational structure, as this could 
help explaining why they were short-lived. 
 
Limitations  
 The major advantage of Chenoweth’s account is that it can explain why citizens are 
motivated to become violent, and why others are not. However, there is no evidence to 
suggest that ELA and RO17N were engaged in a zero-sum conflict game with competing 
groups. The motivation of its members to adopt violence can thus not be explained by the 
theory of the competitive logic. In fact, this thesis fails to come up with an alternative 
immediate cause for ELA and RO17N’s decision to utilize terrorist means. My analysis only 
suggests two circumstantial reasons for the reason to adopt violence: fury about the 
government’s moderate position towards de-juntification and the perceived KKE’s betrayal of 
the working class. These variables do not clarify why so many Greek citizens refrained from 
becoming terrorists.  
 Furthermore, this thesis could not render an explanation for the decline in terrorist 
incidents in the late 1970s. Also, by design this thesis only focused on ELA and RO17N. This 
impacts the extent to which definite claims can be made about the impact of other groups. 
Future research on the Greek case should focus exclusively on all the other terrorist 
organizations that I have identified.  
Regarding a methodological issue, it should be noted that my decision to use process 
tracing to analyze the hypotheses had the disadvantage that lots of data were required in order 
to uncover the complete causal path. As terrorism generally is an underreported social 
phenomenon, it turned out be a challenge to collect an abundance of data. 
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Future of terrorism 
 Dealing with violent radicalized homegrown Islamic extremists is the challenge of 
today’s world. What lessons can be learned from the Greek case and the effect of democracy 
on its proliferation? Is there reason to suspect that the causal mechanisms are comparable? 
There is a pressing ideological differences between leftist revolutionary and Islamic terrorism. 
The latter endorses a ‘martyr culture’ and the use of suicide violence against Western 
democracies. However, both ideologies are inherently hostile towards Western democracy, 
because of either of its secularism and hedonism, or its market strategies. This explains why 
both have ever attempted to use conventional means before they adopted violence.  
 If something is to be learned, I assert that Western states should not adopt the strategy 
of the Greek state in response to terrorism. For over two decades, it responded to Greek 
terrorism against a background of half-measures, polarization, rivalry and exaggeration 
(Kassimeris 2007, 114). Given that the Islamic cells are just as secretive as RO17N and will 
likely maintain a similar operational continuity, Western states should, in their counter-
terrorism policies, stand firm and united. This is the only way to counter violent extremism. 
The recent terrorist events that have unfolded in France offer reason to be cautiously 
optimistic, as the West expressed a sense of togetherness and determination in its aftermath. 
Only then, history will judge present and future terrorists as failed organizations. 
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